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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1. Background 
In many countries, responsibility for retirement savings planning has been shifting from 
governments and employers to individuals. A concern with this shift in responsibility is that 
individuals have been shown to make systematic mistakes in all aspects of their retirement 
savings planning. For example, they under-contribute to their retirement savings plans, under-
diversify their portfolios, pay excessive management fees and drawdown their retirement savings 
too soon (Barber & Odean 2013; Benartzi & Thaler 2007; Mitchell & Utkus 2004).  These 
mistakes can be very costly. Accordingly, this shift in responsibility may be contributing to the 
low retirement incomes that are being observed in countries such as the U.S. (Munnell et al. 
2015). 
Until recently, state-provided pensions were almost always defined benefit plans, which 
pay a retirement income during a retiree’s lifetime based on employment earnings and number of 
years worked. During the last couple of decades, however, governments in most developed 
countries and in some less developed countries started scaling back their defined benefit plans. 
To help compensate for the reduced defined benefit plan benefits, some governments introduced 
mandatory or voluntary defined contribution plans. Under a defined contribution plan, an 
individual’s retirement income is paid solely out of contributions made by or on behalf of the 
individual and the income earned on those contributions. This shift from defined benefit plans to 
defined contribution plans is not driven by efficiency concerns, such as a belief that individuals 
will do a better job than the state of providing for retirement. Rather, this shift was done to allow 
governments more certainty in their pension costs.  Moving from a defined benefit plan to a 
defined contribution plan shifts to individuals certain risks associated with pensions, such as the 
risk that funding costs will increase because of future increases in life expectancies or that 
investment returns will be lower than forecast. (Martin & Whitehouse 2008; European 
Commission 2012b; European Commission 2010).  
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This switch to defined contribution plans has also occurred in employer-provided pension 
plans. Historically, employers who provided pensions to their employees did so through defined 
benefit plans. However, since the beginning of the 1980’s, employers in the U.S., Canada, the 
U.K. and other countries have moved away from providing pensions through DB plans to 
providing them through defined contribution plans (Brown 2016). In a typical defined 
contribution plan, employees contribute to the plan and the employer matches the contribution up 
to some limit. The employee generally chooses the contribution level and makes the investment 
decisions. While the trend towards defined contribution plans is not strong in Western Europe, 
legislation has recently been enacted in Belgium and in Germany to permit employers to offer 
defined contribution plans (Roessler 2017).   
As alluded to in the opening paragraph, individuals make a host of systematic mistakes in 
managing their defined contribution plans. Traditional economists and finance scholars are 
puzzled by these mistakes. Two of the usual tools that traditionalists advocate for – more 
disclosure and better investor education –  do not seem to change this behavior (Benartzi & 
Thaler 2007, p.99). On the other hand, establishing defaults and using other types of nudges have 
had a very large and lasting impact on individuals’ retirement savings planning (e.g. Madrian & 
Shea 2001). Behavioral finance scholars and behavioral economists have done a good job of 
documenting the systematic mistakes that individual make in their retirement savings planning. 
They have identified biases and heuristics which cause people to invest in a sub-optimal manner, 
and they have come up with policies that lead to improved retirement planning behavior. 
However, they have not yet developed a unifying theory for why people are so bad at their 
retirement savings planning.  
The motivation for writing this book is a belief that developing a framework within 
which to analyze why individuals make systematic mistakes in their retirements savings planning 
will help governments and defined contribution plan administrators to design better plans. Better 
crafted retirement plans may allow more people to maintain in retirement the standard of living 
that they enjoyed during their working years. The framework that I develop in this book for why 
people make these systematic mistakes is that the human brain has not evolved to easily solve 
problems relating to retirement savings planning.  This framework is summarized in section 2 
below. 
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2. Natural Selection and Evolutionary Psychology 
The framework that I develop in this book to explain why people deviate from optimal 
retirement savings planning is based on Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection (Darwin 
1859). The theory of natural selection simply provides that heritable traits of an organism will be 
selected for if they help that organism reproduce at a greater rate than others of that species. Of 
course, natural selection also applies to human beings. Our brains (and our cognitive abilities and 
biases) are the way they are because those specific attributes helped our ancestors survive and 
reproduce. In other words, the human brain evolved from earlier forms to what it is today 
because the evolved form allowed our ancestors to better solve recurring problems that they 
faced, such as avoiding predators, obtaining sufficient food and finding and retaining a mate 
(Kenrick et al. 2009).  
The field of evolutionary psychology uses the theory of natural selection to explain 
human behaviour. It is based on a premise that, to understand the behavior of current-day human 
beings, one must consider the behavioral traits that would have been useful for the survival of 
our distant ancestors. During most of the time that the human brain was evolving, humans were 
hunter-gathers who lived in small groups of 150 people or less. As well, over most of that time, 
our social structure, environment and technology changed very slowly. It is only when we started 
farming about 12,000 year ago (a blink of an eye in evolutionary terms) that our social structure, 
environment and technology changed very rapidly, which threw up new problems that people 
needed to solve in order to survive and reproduce (Cosmides & Tooby 1995). Evolutionary 
psychologists assert that, because these changes were so rapid, natural selection has not had 
sufficient time to produce brains that are optimized to solve the problems that our current 
environment has thrown up. In other words, they assert that our brains are better suited to solving 
the problems that hunter-gatherers faced than to problems that arise in modern societies. 
One modern problem that we face and which our hunter-gatherer ancestors did not face is 
saving for retirement, least of all because most hunter-gatherers did not live to an old age 
(Gurven & Kaplan 2007). Saving for retirement using financial markets is something that has 
only become possible for most people over the last few hundred years, at most. That timeframe is 
not nearly long enough for our brains to have evolved to effortlessly solve problems such as how 
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much to consume now versus how much to save and consume in decades from now. The fact that 
our brains are not optimized to solve retirement savings problems is not to suggest that we 
cannot learn to become better at tasks relating to retirement savings. People do learn to be better 
at saving and investing for retirement. However, because our brains did not evolve to specifically 
solve those tasks, solving them does not come easily to most people.  
I am certainly not the first scholar to suggest that we need to consider how our brains 
evolved in order to explain the biases and heuristics that behavioral economists have identified. 
Gerd Gigerenzer’s theory of ecological rationality is based on concepts of natural selection (see 
for example Gigerenzer 2008). Owen Jones, a legal scholar, has used principles of evolutionary 
psychology to analyze, among other things, criminal law (Jones & Goldsmith 2005). As well, 
finance scholars have started using genetics (and the interplay between genes and environment) 
to explain heterogeneity in investment behavior (Barnea et al. 2010; Cronqvist et al. 2015). 
 
3. Research Questions and Methodology 
The main research question of this book is whether evolutionary psychology (which itself 
is grounded in the theory of natural selection) can help to explain the biases and heuristics that 
people have been observed to use in making their retirement savings decisions. I take a multi-
disciplinary approach to answering this question. I start by describing optimal investment 
strategies that have been developed by finance scholars and economists. I then compile and 
analyze in detail the evidence from finance and from behavioral economics that people 
systematically deviate from what finance scholars consider optimal investment strategies. I 
introduce evolutionary psychology and describe how that scholarship may provide a framework 
to explain the deviations from optimal investment strategies that we observe. I also use data from 
psychology and neuroscience to augment the evolutionary psychology framework. At its heart, 
this book is based on empirical research, both data gathered by others and on experiments which 
I conducted. Accordingly, I attempt to support with empirical evidence the theories and 
hypotheses that I develop in answering this research question. 
After dealing with the broad research question, I deal with two specific research 
questions that follow from an evolutionary psychology analysis of retirement savings mistakes. 
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The two specific questions that I take on are (i) whether men under-diversify their stock holdings 
more when the evolutionarily important challenge of finding a mate is made salient to them and 
(ii) whether, in the retirement savings domain, individuals stick to defaults and make the same 
decisions as their peers to avoid the potential for feeling future regret. 
 I again use evidence from the disciplines mentioned in the opening paragraph of this 
section to develop hypotheses relating to each of the two specific questions. However, I go 
beyond formulating theories and hypotheses that are supported with available evidence. I test 
hypotheses relating to these two specific questions by conducting online experiments. The first 
experiment, on mate-seeking salience and under-diversification, is similar in approach to 
experiments conducted by evolutionary psychologists. The second experiment, on regret and its 
association with defaults and peer decisions, is incentivized and is closer in character to 
experiments run by economists.  
Throughout the book, I assess the regulatory consequences of my theories and empirical 
findings using a law and economics framework. 
 
4. Limitations 
As far as I am aware, I am the first to use evolutionary psychology to formulate an 
evolutionary theory to explain the retirement savings mistakes that people make. The task has 
been formidable and I am humble enough to realize that my theories and methodology can be 
improved upon. One purpose of taking the evolutionary approach that I took in this book is to 
stimulate a conversation about the relevance to retirement savings planning of the fact that our 
brains are evolved organs. Therefore, I look forward to having others improve upon my work. 
I have been fortunate enough to have discussed chapters of this book with evolutionary 
psychologists. I have also presented my work at evolutionary psychology conferences and 
workshops. That having been said, I do not have a formal background in evolutionary biology or 
evolutionary psychology. Therefore, I may not have the depth of knowledge in these subjects to 
know when I am making a mistake. However, because of input from those who have that depth 
of knowledge, I am confident that I have not made a fatal mistake. 
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I make no claim that the evolutionary psychology approach is the only approach to 
explaining why people make mistakes in their retirement savings mistakes. My claim is that the 
principle of natural selection can help us better understand why people make these mistakes. 
I conducted only one experiment for each of the two specific research questions. 
Accordingly, caution should be taken in applying the results. It is possible that the results are 
attributable to factors other than the independent variables which were manipulated in the 
experiments. In addition, caution must be taken in generalizing the results of the experiments to 
other situations, such as actual retirement savings behaviour. 
 
5. Content Structure 
The book consists of six chapters, including this introduction. In chapter 2, I explain how 
natural selection and evolutionary psychology may help in developing an underlying theory as to 
why people makes systematic retirement savings mistakes. While the chapter is focussed on 
explaining why and when individuals may under-diversify their stock portfolios, the theoretical 
discussion on evolutionary psychology theories put forward in the chapter can be applied to 
questions of why and when individuals make other seemingly sub-optimal decisions relating to 
their retirement savings planning. 
In chapter 3, I report on an experiment that was conducted to test one of the hypotheses 
from chapter 2. That experiment tested whether males for whom mate-seeking is made salient 
under-diversify their stock portfolios more than other males. The design of the experiment is 
similar to that of evolutionary psychology experiments which test whether males for whom 
mate-seeking is made salient take greater financial risk than males for whom mate-seeking is not 
made salient (e.g. Ermer et al. 2008; Griskevicius et al. 2012).  
Regret is an emotion that helps humans learn from their mistakes. As learning from 
mistakes likely enhanced survival and opportunities to reproduce, having the ability to feel, 
anticipate and avoid regret would have been selected for (Santos & Rosati 2015). The fact that 
regret is a universal trait supports this view (Breugelmans et al. 2014). I hypothesize in chapter 4 
that the emotion of regret may explain many of the retirement savings mistakes that individuals 
have been observed to make. People make retirement savings decisions partly to reduce the 
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potential for regret. Regret may also explain why defaults work so well in the retirement savings 
domain – people follow defaults because it is a regret reducing strategy. 
Chapter 5 reports on an online experiment that I conducted with Pieter Desmet to test 
whether regret may explain why defaults and communicating peer preferences can be so 
effective in changing behavior. In the experiment, subjects decided between two lotteries and 
reported the regret they would feel if the lottery they did not choose paid out more than the 
lottery they chose. Like economics experiments, this experiment was incentivized – one in 
twenty participants were paid based on the outcome of the lottery they decided on.  
Chapter 6 summarizes my main hypotheses and findings, the contribution of my work to 
the literature and the policy implications of my findings. 
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Chapter 2: Under-diversification by Individual Investors: 
Can Evolutionary Psychology Explain it? 
 
There is no clear evidence from experience that the investment policy 
which is socially advantageous coincides with that which is most 
profitable . . . . The game of professional investment is intolerably 
boring and over-exacting to anyone who is entirely exempt from the 
gambling instinct; whilst he who has it must pay to this propensity the 
appropriate toll. 
 
John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money (1935), Chapter 12 
 
 
Abstract 
According to finance theory and supporting evidence, individual investors 
maximize expected returns on their stock market investments by holding a 
diversified stock portfolio and by limiting trading.  However, a substantial subset 
of individual investors deviate from this strategy, causing them to earn, on 
average, a much lower return than if they had followed a diversified strategy. Less 
wealthy investors and investors who are single men deviate from portfolio theory 
more than other investors and, consequently, they earn low stock returns. The 
prevailing view in finance is that individual investors deviate from portfolio 
theory because of irrational overconfidence and reliance on heuristics. In contrast, 
the hypothesis of this chapter is that individual investors deviate from portfolio 
theory and accept lower rates of expected return on investment to try and satisfy 
other, more pressing, needs. I use evolutionary psychology to show that investors 
may be deviating from portfolio theory in an effort to attain evolutionarily 
important goals, such as to acquire status or to acquire a mate.  
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1. Introduction 
A large body of evidence from finance suggests that individuals are atrocious stock 
market investors. They buy and sell the wrong stocks at the wrong time (e.g. Odean 1999; Barber 
& Odean 2001), under-diversify their holdings, (Barber & Odean 2001) and incur excess 
transaction costs by actively managing their stock portfolios, either on their own or through 
advisors (Stout 1995). 
This bad stock market investing behavior costs individual investors a great deal of 
money. For example, using data from a large discount stock brokerage firm, Terrance Odean 
finds that if an individual sells shares of a company to buy shares of another company, on 
average, the return over the following year on the shares that she purchased will be 3.3 
percentage points lower than the return on the shares that she sold (Odean 1999).1 And this is 
before considering either management fees or commissions on the purchase and sale of the 
shares. One law and finance scholar put the total commissions and management fees paid in the 
U.S. in 1992 at over $100 billion, or about 1.8% of the market value of all U.S. equities (Stout 
1995). Under-diversification can also be very expensive for some investors – a 2007 study based 
on the investment holdings of the entire Swedish population showed that, for the most under-
diversified of investors, the cost of under-diversification was more than 5% of their financial 
wealth (Calvet et al. 2007). Under-diversified investors also lose because they tend to hold the 
wrong type of stocks – they prefer stocks that have a chance of a very large gain (so-called 
lottery-type stocks), and these types of stocks tend to greatly underperform the market (Bali et al. 
2011). 
Some groups of investors are more prone to making these investment mistakes than 
others. For example, single men earn worse stock market returns than married men, who in turn 
                                                           
1 The author conjectures that this might occur because stocks that have had recent large price increases tend to be in 
the news and, thus, they attract the attention of individual investors. The high cost to individuals of short-selling 
means that far more of them buy these stocks than can sell them. Individuals sell other stocks to buy the newsworthy 
stocks, driving up the price of the newsworthy stocks above their intrinsic value. Some of these newsworthy stocks 
later revert to their intrinsic value and individual investors lose money (Odean 1999, p.19). Why arbitrage might not 
always work to prevent stocks exceeding their intrinsic value is discussed in section 2.3 of this chapter. 
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earn worse returns than women (Barber & Odean 2001). As well, less wealthy and less well-
educated investors are more prone to making investment mistakes, and thus are more prone to 
earning lower stock market returns than their wealthier and more educated counterparts (Calvet 
et al. 2009; Anderson 2013). 
That this bad stock market behavior persists in the face of evidence of its cost is 
perplexing to finance scholars. Given the wealth of information available to investors through the 
media and professional advisors, it ought to be easy for individual investors to avoid making the 
investment mistakes described above.2 The rules that individual investors should follow if they 
wish to maximize their risk-adjusted returns are well-known and uncontroversial. The bedrock 
investment rule is the portfolio theory of stock market investing, which was first formalized by 
Markowitz (1952a). Since that time, variants of portfolio theory have been universally accepted 
by finance scholars and professionals as the preferred model for stock market investment (See 
for example Bodie et al. 2011). The gist of portfolio theory is that investors maximize their risk-
adjusted returns by investing in a portfolio of stocks that is diversified by industry and 
geographically. The percentage of their assets that an investor ought to invest in stocks will 
depend on the degree of his or her risk aversion – the higher an investor’s risk aversion, the 
lower the percentage of his or her wealth that the investor ought to invest in stocks (Bodie et al. 
2011). However, the basic diversification strategy will apply regardless of investor risk aversion 
level. A concept that follows from portfolio theory is that, as individual investors generally do 
not have access to non-public information about individual stocks, they should not try to 
outperform the stock market through trading – such activity will increase transaction costs 
without increasing expected returns. Individual investors ought to buy and sell stocks only for 
liquidity reasons, for tax reasons or to rebalance their portfolio to match their risk aversion level 
(Bodie et al. 2011).  
Economists assume that individuals invest in the stock market for the same reason that 
they engage in other forms of savings. They invest to temporally maximize their utility. They 
reduce their current consumption and invest the amount of the reduction in the stock market to 
                                                           
2 In fact, there is evidence that investors who use financial advisers earn lower risk-adjusted returns than those who 
do not (Hackethal et al. 2012). There is also evidence that those with less financial literacy are less likely to seek out 
financial advice (Calcagno & Monticone 2015). 
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increase their consumption in the future.3 But if this were the sole reason for individuals 
investing in the stock market, individuals would invest according to the tenets of portfolio 
theory, as that strategy has been shown to be the one that maximizes returns (and thus maximizes 
future consumption). The question that this chapter focuses on is: In the face of overwhelming 
evidence that diverging from portfolio theory is so costly, why don’t individual investors invest 
according to the tenets of portfolio theory?  
The prevailing view amongst economists and finance scholars is that individuals depart 
from portfolio theory because they lack relevant information or because they suffer from 
cognitive distortions. The hypothesis of this chapter is that many people invest in the stock 
market not only to maximize their expected return on investment, but also to (consciously or 
unconsciously) satisfy other (often more pressing) human needs, and that deviating from 
portfolio theory better satisfies those other needs. Accordingly, deviating from portfolio theory 
may even be a sensible strategy for some investors, rather than being solely due to cognitive 
distortions or to a lack of information. 
This hypothesis is based on two recent lines of research relating to gambling. Firstly, a 
number of finance scholars have presented empirical evidence that investors who participate in 
gambling activities, such as buying lottery tickets, are more likely than non-gamblers to deviate 
from portfolio theory (See for example Kumar 2009). Secondly, recent research in psychology 
and evolutionary psychology suggests that people gamble to satisfy needs, rather than, as was 
previously thought, solely because they suffer from cognitive distortions (Binde 2013). The fact 
that gamblers are more likely than non-gamblers to deviate from portfolio theory suggests that 
people deviate from portfolio theory at least partly for the same reasons that they gamble.  If they 
gamble in an attempt to satisfy certain needs, then they may also deviate from portfolio theory in 
an attempt to satisfy those same needs (Kumar et al. 2011). 
What needs might investors be attempting to satisfy by deviating from portfolio theory? 
There is survey data and other evidence that individual investors deviate from portfolio theory 
because that manner of investing gives them the same form of enjoyment or entertainment as 
they get from gambling (Dorn & Sengmueller 2009). More interestingly, though, is that there is 
                                                           
3See (Samuelson 1958) for an early economics savings-consumption model. 
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also evidence that individual investors both gamble and deviate from portfolio theory to satisfy 
needs much more profound than entertainment (Binde 2013).  
Using experiments and other sources of data, evolutionary psychologists show that young 
single men of low status take far more risk than others, and that they take these risks to obtain 
social status or to increase their chances of acquiring a mate, both of which are evolutionarily 
very important (Daly & Wilson 2001). Evolutionary psychologists have also shown that the same 
pattern applies to financial risk-taking. In a number of experiments, men (but not women) who 
are primed to compete for status or for mate acquisition take riskier financial decisions than 
when they are not so primed (Ermer et al. 2008). Accordingly, the evidence from finance that 
single men and people of lower social status deviate from portfolio theory more than other 
investors is consistent with an evolutionary psychology explanation for why investors deviate 
from portfolio theory (Kumar 2009). That is, some investors may deviate from portfolio theory 
in an attempt to satisfy evolutionarily important needs, such as the need for social status or the 
need to acquire a mate. There is also some evidence from evolutionary psychology that risk 
taking does indeed help men to achieve their goals of increasing status and acquiring a mate 
(Sylwester & Pawłowski 2011). It follows from this evidence that, even though deviating from 
portfolio theory reduces expected returns on investment, deviating may actually be a sensible 
strategy for status-seeking or mate-seeking investors. 
That investors deviate from portfolio theory for reasons other than those associated with 
maximizing expected returns on investment is not a novel idea. The concept has been considered 
(and even modelled) in the economics literature and in recent finance literature (Barberis & 
Huang 2001; Barberis & Xiong 2009; Barberis & Xiong 2012; Fama & French 2007). However, 
the contribution of this chapter is to use an interdisciplinary approach (i.e. finance, psychology 
and evolutionary psychology) to attempt to explain the needs that individual investors might be 
trying to satisfy by deviating from portfolio theory.  
In Part II, I show how individuals deviate from portfolio theory and how costly these 
deviations are to individual investors. In Part III, primarily using evolutionary psychology, I 
describe the needs individual investors may be attempting to satisfy by deviating from portfolio 
theory. Part IV concludes. 
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2. Suboptimal Investing – Nature of the Problem and its Cost 
2.1. Stock Market Investing: Theory versus Practice 
Modern portfolio theory assumes that investors are driven by only two factors – they like 
to earn expected returns on their portfolio but dislike variance of those returns.  In 1952, Harry 
Markowitz constructed a model showing that an investor can reduce but not completely 
eliminate variance of returns by holding a portfolio of securities that have a low covariance of 
returns with one another (Markowitz 1952a). Relying on the assumptions that investors care only 
about expected return and return variance, William Sharpe and John Lintner each separately 
developed a model of capital asset pricing known as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”), 
and which has become the workhorse of modern finance (Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965).4  Under 
the CAPM, variance of expected return on a stock is driven by two types of risk: company-
specific risk (also called idiosyncratic risk) and systematic risk. Company-specific risk is, by 
definition, uncorrelated to market prices in general, and can be eliminated by holding a large 
number of stocks.5  Accordingly, that risk is not priced. Systematic risk of an asset can be 
thought of as the extent to which the price of that asset moves with movements in market prices 
in general – the more that the price of an asset moves with market price movements, the larger is 
the systematic risk.6 The main inference of the CAPM is that the expected return on an asset is 
positively and linearly related to its systematic risk and that no other factor affects the expected 
return (Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965). Based on the CAPM, an investor maximizes her risk-
adjusted return by investing in some combination of a risk-free asset7 and as widely diversified a 
portfolio of risky assets as possible (Lintner 1965, p.14). 
                                                           
4 In their models, Sharpe and Lintner both assume that investors have homogeneous expectations and that investors 
can borrow and lend funds at the risk-free rate of interest. Sharpe recognizes the unrealistic nature of these 
assumptions (Sharpe 1964, p.434). 
5 By holding a very large number of stocks, an investor’s variance of returns is minimized because negative 
company-specific shocks are likely to be balanced by positive company-specific shocks. 
6 For example, all stocks tend to do well in periods of strong economic growth and tend to do poorly in times of 
weak growth (Sharpe 1964, p.441). 
7 In the finance literature, long-term bonds issued by a government in its own currency are generally considered to 
be the risk-free asset. This is because a country that issues debt in its own currency will always be able to repay that 
debt. However, where a country is not permitted to print unlimited amounts of its own currency, such as countries 
that use the Euro, there is a default risk associated with government debt (Damodaran 2008). 
 15 
 
While the CAPM continues to be the workhorse of finance, the relationship between risk 
and return implied by the CAPM has been very difficult to prove empirically.8 Most studies 
show that the correlation between risk and return is positive but that the relationship is less 
monotonic and much flatter than the theory predicts (Subrahmanyam 2007) Two explanations 
have been given for the failure of the CAPM to predict expected stock returns. Richard Rolls 
suggests that the market portfolio is unknowable and, as a result, “there is practically no 
possibility that . . . [a test of the CAPM] . . .  can be accomplished in the future” (Roll 1977, 
p.129).9 The second explanation is that the CAPM fails because the assumptions on which it is 
based, such as the assumption that investors have homogeneous expectations of future returns 
and that arbitrage is cost-free, do not hold (Stout 1995; Fama & French 2004). 
Even if the CAPM is flawed, there is little doubt that holding a diversified portfolio of 
stocks and minimizing trading is the strategy that individual investors ought to follow if their 
goal is to maximize their risk-adjusted expected returns.10 To minimize company specific risk 
(and thus to maximize risk-adjusted returns), investors ought to hold a portfolio of stocks that is 
diversified across companies, industries and countries. As well, an investor ought not to trade 
stock except for liquidity reasons, for tax reasons or to rebalance her portfolio so that the risk 
profile of the portfolio matches her risk aversion level at any particular time (Bodie et al. 2011). 
For ease of reference, in the remainder of this chapter, I will use the term portfolio theory to 
mean any investment strategy that conforms to the concepts of wide diversification and limited 
trading. 
A vast finance literature shows that individual investors regularly deviate from portfolio 
theory in a variety of ways.11 These deviations may be usefully slotted into two categories – 
active portfolio management and under-diversification.  Active portfolio management means that 
individual investors trade too much relative to the dictates of portfolio theory (Barber & Odean 
                                                           
8 For a summary of the evidence against the CAPM, see Fama & French (2004) or Subrahmanyam (2007). 
9 In theory, the market portfolio would include all possible assets (including such things as human capital) and not 
just stocks (Fama & French 2004; Miller 1977). 
10 Many studies show that the portfolios of individual investors who hold a diversified portfolio and minimize 
trading perform best (For an overview of these studies, see Barber & Odean 2013). 
11 Deviations from portfolio theory are enumerated and extensively discussed in Barber & Odean (2013). For a 
discussion on how individual investors differ in their investment behavior from institutional investors, see Kumar et 
al. (2013). 
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2000).12 Behavior that falls into the category of under-diversification include holding too few 
stocks,13 holding stocks whose returns are highly correlated with one another (Goetzmann & 
Kumar 2008) and having a strong home bias.14 As well, under-diversified individual investors 
prefer to hold stocks that exhibit the risk profile associated with lottery tickets; that is, they want 
stocks that have a low cost, a large chance of a small loss and a small chance of a large gain 
(Kumar 2009; Goetzmann & Kumar 2008). Alok Kumar finds that individual investors are more 
likely to hold lottery-type stocks than institutional investors and that less wealthy individual 
investors are more likely to hold lottery-type stocks than wealthier individuals (Kumar 2009). 
The essence of the under-diversification problem is that under-diversified investors take 
on risk for which they are not compensated. An under-diversified investor could reduce the 
riskiness of his portfolio without reducing his expected return simply by spreading his 
investment over a greater number of stock holdings (Bodie et al. 2011). Note that an investor 
could hold a very risky portfolio and still comply with portfolio theory. For example, an investor 
who had $10,000 to invest could, in theory, borrow $30,000 and invest the full $40,000 in a very 
broad-based basket of stocks. This would certainly be a risky strategy since a 25% decline in 
stock prices would wipe out the investor. However, this strategy would be fully in keeping with 
portfolio theory since the investor would be employing a diversified buy and hold strategy. 
Accordingly, a risk-seeking investor need not deviate from portfolio theory to satisfy her desire 
for risk. However, the preference for lottery-type stocks suggests that individual investors do not 
want just any risk; they want stocks that have a risk profile which includes the possibility of a 
very big win. 
 
                                                           
12Using a large data set from a U.S. discount broker, Barber & Odean find that the average portfolio turnover rate is 
75% per year (far more than seems necessary for liquidity, tax or rebalancing purposes). Even where investors 
choose to delegate their stock trading activity by investing through actively managed mutual funds, they trade the 
mutual funds more than seems optimal. Lynn Stout calculated that the rate of turnover of mutual fund holdings was 
26% in 1991 (Stout 1995) 
13 Barber & Odean (2000) find that the average number of stocks held by individual investors was 4. Goetzmann & 
Kumar (2008) find that between 1991 and 1996, the average number of stocks went from 4 to 7. Both studies find 
that individual investors tended to hold more volatile stocks (with positive skewness) than the market. 
14 An investor who has a home bias invests primarily in stocks of companies headquartered in the country of 
residence of the investor (See Strong & Xu 2003 for the proposition that individual investors tend to invest 
overwhelmingly in stocks of companies in their home country; See French & Poterba 1991 for the proposition that 
the percentage of investors’ portfolios dedicated to foreign stocks has increased over time; See French 2008 for the 
proposition that investors who trade excessively also tend to buy local stocks; also see Goetzmann & Kumar 2008). 
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2.2. Bad Investment Behaviour is Costly 
Active management and excess trading is very costly to investors. Kenneth French puts 
the overall cost of active investing in the United States in 2006 at $106 billion, or $330 per 
American (French 2008). In a U.S. study of 1992 active investing costs, Lynn Stout calculated 
costs of over $100 billion dollars (Stout 1995) A Taiwanese study found that individual investors 
lose a staggering 3.8 percentage points of investment return each year because of excess trading 
(Barber et al. 2006) Two-thirds of the loss is attributable to unnecessary trading commissions 
and transaction taxes and the remaining one-third is attributable to the fact that shares that 
individual investors sell perform better than the shares that they buy (Barber et al. 2006) A recent 
Swedish study found that investors who are frequent traders perform more poorly than passive 
investors (Anderson 2013) Mirroring the Taiwanese study, they find that two-thirds of the 
underperformance is attributable to unnecessary transaction costs and one-third is attributable to 
“stock selection or timing” (Anderson 2013, p.4) The study also shows that less educated and 
less wealthy investors bear a much higher proportion of trading losses than other investors, 
relative to the value of their stock portfolios.15  
The cost of under-diversification is more difficult to quantify. Under-diversification 
reduces the risk-adjusted returns to investors, but, for most investors, this is not nearly as costly 
as active management (Calvet et al. 2007). However, for some investors, under-diversification 
has been shown to be very costly. For example, the evidence in a study of Swedish households is 
that 5% of the population lose more than 5% of their financial wealth because they are under-
diversified (Calvet et al. 2007). Goetzman and Kumar (2008) find that, adjusted for risk, the least 
diversified group of investors underperforms the most diversified group by 2.4 percentage points. 
Large losses associated with under-diversification have also been identified for individuals who 
invest their self-directed pension plans in company stock (Meulbroek 2005). 
Another cost associated with under-diversification relates to the fact that under-
diversified individual investors prefer to hold lottery-type stocks. A preference on the part of 
some investors for lottery-type stocks may increase the price (and thus reduce the expected 
returns) of those stocks to below what the CAPM predicts. Accordingly, undiversified individual 
investors not only take on risk for which they are not fully compensated, they further reduce their 
                                                           
15 Investors who did not have a university degree and who were among the 40% least wealthy in the country owned 
3% of total financial wealth but bore 27% of the trading losses (Anderson 2013, p.5). 
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expected return by buying overpriced lottery-type stocks. Kumar finds that the return on lottery-
type stocks is almost 8% lower than on non-lottery-type stocks (Kumar 2009). As lottery-type 
stocks are held disproportionately by less sophisticated and less wealthy individuals, those 
investors bear a high proportion of this cost relative to the size of their stock portfolios. In the 
remainder of this Part, I review the finance literature which empirically shows that lottery-type 
stocks are overpriced and explain how lottery-type stock overpricing could persist. The 
discussion is somewhat technical, although I expect that even those without a finance 
background can follow it. However, readers can skip ahead to Part III without losing the thread 
of the chapter. 
 
2.3. Overpricing of Lottery-type Stocks 
Andrew Ang et al. find that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility16 at a given point in 
time tend to have low future returns relative to the stock market as a whole (Ang et al. 2006). 
Stocks in the top quintile of idiosyncratic volatility underperform stocks in the bottom quintile of 
idiosyncratic volatility by about 1% per month (Ang et al. 2006, p.261). This is contrary to what 
theory suggests, which is that there ought to be no correlation between the idiosyncratic volatility 
and expected returns. Recent studies have also purported to show that the returns on stocks 
predominantly held by individual investors (which tend to be stocks exhibiting high price 
volatility) do not increase with the volatility of the stock price. In fact, in some studies, the 
returns on such stocks has been shown to decrease with the level of idiosyncratic volatility. This 
seemingly perverse risk-return relationship has been observed in recent U.S., Dutch and German 
studies (Goetzmann & Kumar 2008; Hoffmann & Shefrin 2014; Meyer & Schroff 2013, 
respectively). However, Bali et al. (2011) show that if the preference for holding stocks that 
exhibit an extreme positive return (i.e. lottery-type stocks) is taken into account, this result 
reverses and returns on such stocks increase slightly with the level of idiosyncratic volatility.17 
This finding is consistent with Kumar, who finds that the average annual risk-adjusted return for 
portfolios held by individual investors is 1.1 percentage points less than the return on a market 
                                                           
16 Idiosyncratic volatility is stock price volatility that is not correlated with the market, but that results from 
company-specific risks. See section 2.1 of this chapter for a discussion of company-specific risk versus market risk. 
 
17 This relationship between positive skewness and expected returns is not observed for shares held primarily by 
institutional rather than individual investors (Chichernea et al. 2014; Also see Han & Kumar 2013) 
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portfolio and that this underperformance increases as the percentage of lottery-type stocks in the 
portfolio increases (Kumar 2009). This research suggests that it is the preference for positive 
skewness that is priced, not a more abstract preference for risk.  
Shares of companies that have gone into financial distress are an example of lottery-type 
stocks. Campbell et al. find that shares of financially distressed companies have higher than 
average systematic volatility (Campbell et al. 2008). The CAPM predicts, therefore, that such 
shares ought to have higher than average returns. However, Campbell et al. (2008) find that 
shares of distressed companies have lower than market returns. Kauser et al. (2013) posit that the 
reason why shares of distressed companies underperform is that their price is driven up by 
investors because of their “lottery-type” attributes. They attribute the underperformance to 
“gambling-motivated” trading behavior of individual investors (Kausar et al. 2013). Shares of 
companies that are in financial distress fit the profile of lottery-type stocks because they have a 
very low price, there is a large chance of the shares becoming worthless and a small chance of a 
very large return if the company is able to become viable. A recent example is the shares of 
American Airlines. American Airlines went bankrupt in November 2011 and its shares traded as 
low as $0.20 in that month. However, by April 2014, the price had increased to $27 – 135 times 
the price in November 2011.18 In almost all bankruptcy cases, shareholders lose virtually all their 
investment, but in this particular case the shareholders got a very big win. 
At the heart of the CAPM is the assumption that investors need to be compensated for 
taking on risk – the higher the systematic risk of a stock, the more expected return that an 
investor will demand in order to hold that stock (Markowitz 1952a; Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965). 
It has been assumed in the literature that the compensation for taking on risk is always in the 
form of higher expected return. However, the compensation could be partly in a form other than 
expected returns on investment – for example, it might just be in the form of the enjoyment that 
some investors receive from investing in the stock market.19 The compensation that is in a form 
other than expected returns on investment would be difficult to measure and may be greater for 
certain types of stock, such as lottery-type stocks. If investors obtain greater enjoyment from 
holding lottery-type stocks than from holding other stocks, they may be prepared to pay more for 
                                                           
18 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303456104579489282879045884 
19 See discussion in Part III.A. 
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those stock (in other words, they might be willing to accept a lower expected return) than the 
price predicted by the CAPM.20 This preference on the part of individual investors might be what 
causes the expected return on those stocks to be less (and the price to be higher) than the CAPM 
predicts (Barberis & Huang 2008).  
In theory, if the preferences of individual investors cause certain stocks to exhibit a lower 
level of expected return than the CAPM predicts, arbitrageurs would short sell that stock until the 
expected return on that stock equals the expected return predicted by the CAPM. In practice, 
though, arbitrage may be difficult to accomplish and, in any event, it will not be costless.21 
Arbitrageurs need to borrow stock (which may be difficult, particularly for stock of smaller 
companies) in order to short sell it (Baker & Wurgler 2006). If the individual investor sentiment 
for a stock is strong, arbitrageurs may need to hold a large undiversified short position in that 
stock for an extended period of time (Baker & Wurgler 2006). This is a risky proposition and 
arbitrageurs would have to balance that risk against their expected profit on the short position. 
Accordingly, arbitrageurs may be unwilling to short certain stocks, with the result that the low 
expected return may persist (Shleifer & Vishny 1997).22 It is even possible that a superior 
strategy for professional traders is to buy stocks that they believe are overpriced, with the 
expectation that individual investors will bid up the prices of those stocks even further (Blanc & 
Rachlinski 2005). 
 
3. Using Evolution to Explain Deviations from Portfolio Theory 
Under-diversification and active portfolio management are difficult to explain using 
traditional finance or economics models (Subrahmanyam 2007). Under economic theory, 
investing in the stock market is a form of savings; that is, as with other forms of savings, by 
investing in the stock markets, individuals reduce their current consumption in order to fund 
                                                           
20  This analysis is similar to that employed by (Brunnermeier et al. 2007). They suggest that individual investors 
obtain utility from choosing to hold optimistic beliefs about future outcomes, and that they design their investment 
portfolios in such a way as to maximize the sum of the optimistic beliefs utility and the utility that they obtain from 
earning high returns on their investments. 
21 For an extensive discussion on the difficulties that arbitrageurs face, see (Barberis & Thaler 2003). 
22 For additional literature on the difficulty of arbitrage, see (Bali et al. 2011, p.444). Fama & French (2007) show 
mathematically that if some investors obtain utility from holding stock that is unrelated to the expected return on 
that stock, the price of that stock will remain higher than what the CAPM predicts, even if arbitrageurs are active. 
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future consumption.23 If, as the traditional finance and economics models assume, the sole reason 
for investing in the stock market is to shift consumption into the future, rational individual 
investors would invest according to portfolio theory because that investing style has been shown 
to maximize risk-adjusted expected returns (and hence to maximize the expected amount 
available for future consumption).24 Accordingly, in the face of the overwhelming evidence that 
individual investors deviate substantially from portfolio theory and that such deviations are 
costly, individual investors who deviate from portfolio theory must either (i) be acting 
irrationally (that is, in a way that does not maximize their utility) or (ii) be attempting to satisfy 
needs that can be better satisfied by investing in a manner that deviates from portfolio theory.25 
Over the last 30 years or so, many finance scholars have adopted concepts developed by 
behavioral economists to explain why investors deviate from portfolio theory (e.g. 
Subrahmanyam 2007). A common behavioral explanation is that individual investors trade 
excessively and under-diversify because they are overconfident in their own stock picking 
abilities.26 Another common explanation is that investors base their decisions to buy and sell 
stocks on recent price movement using the so-called availability heuristic.27 Excess trading and 
under-diversification may also be aggravated by the disposition effect; investors sell their 
winning stocks and keep their losers, rather than simply keeping both winners and losers (Odean 
1998). The behavioral analysis assumes that under-diversification and excessive trading are 
irrational and that, with the right incentives and information, investors will change their behavior 
(Subrahmanyam 2007).28  
 
                                                           
23 This theory relies on the economics concept of declining marginal utility. Rather than spending all their income as 
they earn it, individuals prefer to consume evenly over time. Accordingly, they will save in their high income years 
and use that savings to consume more in low income years (Samuelson 1958). 
24 Or, alternatively, to minimize the amount of current consumption they need to give up to attain a certain level of 
future consumption.  
25 I suggest that, to know whether a particular behavior is rational, we need to know the objective that the investor is 
attempting to reach. See for example (Sugden 2008). 
26 For a discussion of overconfidence and under-diversification, see Goetzmann & Kumar (2008). 
27Under the availability heuristic, individual investors base their investment decisions on readily available 
information, such as recent stock price movements or recent news items (Goetzmann & Kumar 2008).  
28The irrationality of this type of behavior was first discussed by (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). 
 22 
 
There is a great deal of empirical literature supporting both the behavioral effects 
discussed in the previous paragraph and the proposition that those behavioral effects reduce 
investors’ expected returns.29 However, there is also evidence that factors such as overconfidence 
may not be the main reason for why people deviate from portfolio theory. In a study using 
trading data and an investor survey, Daniel Dorn and Gur Huberman show that self-reported 
overconfidence does not explain the degree of diversification or of trading (Dorn & Huberman 
2005). Experiments have been conducted that only weakly support the proposition that people 
who are overconfident trade more (Deaves et al. 2008; Glaser & Weber 2007) and have poorer 
performance (Biais et al. 2005). Mark Grinblatt and Matti Keloharju show that sensation seeking 
and overconfidence both contribute to excess trading, but that sensation seeking is the more 
explanatory of the two variables (Grinblatt & Keloharju 2000). There appears to be even less of a 
link between overconfidence and under-diversification. Alok Kumar finds that the propensity to 
under-diversify is negatively correlated with measures of overconfidence (Kumar 2009; also see 
Kausar et al. 2013). Accordingly, in the face of this often conflicting empirical evidence of the 
role that overconfidence plays, it is worth considering other potential explanations for why 
individual investors deviate from portfolio theory. 
The hypothesis of this chapter is that individual investors deviate from portfolio theory to 
(consciously or unconsciously) satisfy needs that they could not satisfy if they invested 
according to portfolio theory. I defer until later a discussion of what needs investors may be 
attempting to satisfy by deviating from portfolio theory. However, I do assume that the needs 
that investing in the stock market satisfy, other than those associated with maximizing expected 
returns, are all forms of current consumption.  
Earlier in this Part, I introduced the concept of savings as a mechanism for temporally 
maximizing utility. I also suggested that that mechanism applied equally to stock market 
investing; that is, by investing in the stock market, people decrease their current consumption to 
increase their future consumption. However, the analysis changes somewhat if individuals invest 
in the stock market partly for current consumption. 
Investor decisions regarding the extent to which they follow or deviate from portfolio 
theory can be thought of as attempts to further temporally maximize utility by balancing current 
                                                           
29 For a recent summary and analysis of this literature, see Barber & Odean (2013). 
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consumption against future consumption. By deviating from portfolio theory, investors give up 
some future consumption (because they earn lower stock market returns) in order to derive 
current consumption. In theory, an investor who derives current consumption by investing 
contrary to portfolio theory could achieve a similar mix of current versus future consumption by 
(i) reducing the amount that he invests in the stock market but investing according to the tenets 
of portfolio theory and (ii) spending the amount of the investment reduction on goods or services 
that give the investor the same type of current consumption that he would have derived if he had 
deviated from portfolio theory. To determine whether to follow or to deviate from portfolio 
theory, the investor would need to compare the utility that he derives under each of those 
strategies. It is conceivable that an investor who makes this calculation (explicitly or implicitly) 
would decide that deviating from portfolio theory is a utility maximizing strategy, even though it 
is not a strategy that maximizes expected returns on investment.  
It follows from this hypothesis that, even if individual investors could be convinced that 
their stock market investing behavior was costing them in terms of reduced future consumption, 
they would continue to trade excessively and under-diversify so long as the utility that they 
derive from investing in that manner was greater than the utility that they would derive by 
investing according to portfolio theory. 
There is evidence that individual investors do enjoy investing in the stock market in a 
manner that deviates from portfolio theory, and that they do not derive that same enjoyment by 
following portfolio theory. In a comprehensive U.S. survey of investors who held accounts at a 
full-service broker, respondents reacted more positively to the following statements regarding 
their attitudes towards investing than any other of the proffered statements: “I enjoy investing 
and look forward to more such activity in the future” and “relying exclusively on mutual funds 
reduces the personal satisfaction I obtain from making my own investments.”30  
In a study of German investors which matched survey responses to trading records from a 
discount broker, those who responded positively to the question of whether they enjoyed 
investing traded much more than those who responded negatively to that question (Dorn & 
Sengmueller 2009). Similar results were found in a Dutch study matching survey results to 
                                                           
30 They rated those statements at 4.09 and 3.94, respectively, with 5 being the most positive response (Lease et al. 
1974). 
 24 
 
trading records (Hoffmann & Shefrin 2008). Nicholas Barberis and Ming Xiong suggest that the 
disposition effect (i.e. investors sell their winners and keep losers) is caused by what they call 
“realization utility”; that is, investors enjoy the feelings associated with selling winners and are 
averse to the feelings associated with selling losers (Barberis & Xiong 2012). A subsequent 
experiment tested the realization utility theory by taking images of participants’ brains using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging while those participants were engaged in a simulated 
trading game. The results were that when issuing sell orders on winning stocks, participants 
experience a sharp rise in activity in the part of the brain associated with feelings of pleasure 
(Frydman et al. 2014). 
While these studies are evidence that some people deviate from portfolio theory because 
it gives them a form of current consumption (i.e. enjoyment or entertainment), the studies do not 
consider whether investors consider the very substantial cost of deviating from portfolio theory. 
Accordingly, these studies do not answer the question of whether investor deviations from 
portfolio theory are rational since investors might not be aware that their investment behavior is 
significantly reducing their return on investment. 
Nor do the studies deal with the question of what it is about deviating from portfolio 
theory that investors enjoy. Do they enjoy deviating from portfolio theory simply because that 
manner of investing is entertaining, in the same way that watching a movie is entertaining? Or 
does the enjoyment come about because deviating from portfolio theory satisfies more profound 
needs? I make the case below that individuals may be deviating from portfolio theory invest to 
satisfy evolutionarily important needs, such as the need for status and the need to find a mate. 
The building blocks of my case are (i) recent finance literature which finds that investors who 
deviate from portfolio theory are also prone to engaging in gambling and other risky behavior 
and (ii) recent psychology and evolutionary psychology literature which finds that people may 
gamble and engage in other risky behavior to satisfy evolutionarily important needs. I will 
expand on those building blocks below, after which I will develop an evolutionary framework 
for why individuals deviate from portfolio theory. 
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3.1. Stock Market Investment as Gambling: The Evidence 
From the earliest days of portfolio theory, it has been mooted that some people deviate 
from portfolio theory because they like to gamble.31 It may seem intuitive that people who 
participate in the stock market by under-diversifying or through excess trading may also be the 
same people who like to gamble. However, it is only recently that the link between stock market 
investment behavior and gambling propensity has been empirically tested.32 While this literature 
is still in a nascent stage, the link between investment behavior and gambling is compelling.   
Using account data (including stockholdings, trading and demographic information) from 
a discount brokerage firm, Kumar finds that individual investors who under-diversify prefer to 
invest in lottery-type stocks, which Kumar defines as stocks that have attributes associated with 
lottery tickets. As mentioned earlier, these attributes include a low price, a large chance of a 
small loss and a small chance of a large gain. Stocks that have a high positive skewness of 
returns (Kumar et al. 2011) or “that exhibit an extreme positive return” (Bali et al. 2011; Mitton 
2007) have these attributes. A desire to hold lottery-type stocks would tend to result in under-
diversification since diversification would reduce the chance of a truly big win. Suppose that an 
individual investor has a preference for a small chance of an extreme positive return and that the 
only two stocks that are available to him each have a 1% chance of a tenfold increase in price. 
Also assume that the return on one stock is independent of the return on the other. If the investor 
holds one stock, he has a 1% chance of a tenfold return. If he holds both stocks he has only a 
0.01% chance of a tenfold return.33 If the investor’s objective is to maximize his chances of 
earning the extreme tenfold return, he will buy just one of the two stocks. This concept may be 
generalized to the real world of investing. The more stocks an investor owns, the more likely it is 
that he will earn a market return rather than a return that is much higher (or lower) than the 
market return.  
Kumar (2009) finds empirically that those investors who fit the profile of lottery ticket 
buyers (such as young single men) are more likely to both under-diversify and to buy lottery-
                                                           
31 In fact, Markowitz himself suggests that stock market speculation is “gambling”.  He posited that some people 
may like to buy stocks that have a small chance of a large gain (Markowitz 1952b). 
32 Kumar (2009) was the first to empirically test the link between gambling and stock market investing. 
33 Since the returns on each stock are assumed to be independent of each other, the chance of getting a tenfold return 
by holding both stocks is 1% multiplied by 1%. 
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type stocks. He also finds that those of low relative status – those relatively poorer than their 
neighbours – buy both more lottery tickets and more lottery-type stocks  Based on an analysis of 
the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey, Geng Li also finds that people who gamble are more 
active in stock markets (Li 2012). The implication of this research is that an investor’s propensity 
to gamble somehow affects his or her stock market investing behavior.  
Recent empirical studies find that stock trading substitutes for lottery ticket purchases in 
the U.S., in Germany and in Taiwan – individual investors trade less during periods where the 
national lottery jackpot is high (Dorn et al. 2014; Gao & Lin 2014). This effect is greater for 
male and less educated investors and in the trading of lottery-type stocks (Dorn et al. 2014). 
Kumar (2009) also finds that, like the demand for lottery tickets, the demand for lottery-type 
stocks increases in bad economic times. A Swedish study used trading records and tax records to 
find that those who hold under-diversified portfolios also trade excessively, and that those who 
engage in that behavior tend to have lower income, wealth, age and education (attributes that are 
associated with lottery ticket buyers) (Anderson 2013). Lucasz Weber and Elke Markiewicz 
recruited participants into a simulated investment game and, at the end of the game, had 
participants complete a DOSPERT (a measure of gambling propensity) survey (Markiewicz & 
Weber 2013). They found that “gambling risk-taking propensity predicts trading volume”. Mark 
Grinblatt and Matti Keloharju used Finnish investor tax filings, driving records and 
psychological tests given to military recruits to find that excess trading is driven by both 
sensation seeking (measured in the number of speeding tickets) and by overconfidence 
(measured by psychological tests administered by the military) (Grinblatt & Keloharju 2009). 
These studies are all consistent with the proposition that stock trading substitutes for forms of 
gambling, such as lotteries. 
As discussed in Part II.C., the empirical evidence is that the expected returns on lottery-
type stocks is lower than on non-lottery-type stocks (Bali et al. 2011; Barberis & Huang 2008). 
Accordingly, investors who are only interested in maximizing their expected returns ought not to 
buy lottery-type stocks. The fact that individual investors do buy lottery-type stocks might just 
mean that they fail to understand that the expected return on those shares is lower than the 
expected return on non-lottery-type stocks. Experiments have shown that people do 
misunderstand probabilities in many gambling situations, but there is also evidence that people 
gamble even when they understand the probabilities. In a 2006 Canadian study, students were 
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given specialized instruction on the statistics of gambling. Six months after the end of the 
instruction, those same students were tested on their ability to calculate gambling odds, and were 
found to be better able to calculate those odds than before the instruction. However, the study 
also found that those students were no more likely to decrease their gambling behavior than 
students in the control group (Williams & Connelly 2006). In addition, a number of studies 
involving pathological gamblers also find that there is little or no correlation between numerical 
reasoning skills and gambling behavior (Lambos & Delfabbro 2007). These studies suggest that 
gambling is not due to a simple misconception of the relationship between risks and return. The 
studies support the proposition that people engage in gambling behaviour because they derive 
utility from it. To the extent that individual investors deviate from portfolio theory to satisfy the 
same needs that gambling satisfies, these studies also support the proposition that individual 
investors derive utility from deviating from portfolio theory.  
Additional support for the proposition that individual investors know what they are doing 
when they deviate from portfolio theory is found in Dorn & Huberman (2005). They use German 
brokerage account data and survey data to find that individual investors who self-report being 
less risk averse hold less diversified portfolios and trade much more often. As well, in a U.S. 
study matching survey data with brokerage account data, those who said they were willing to 
take more risk held fewer stocks (Polkovnichenko 2005). These studies suggest that investors are 
not unaware of the level of risk that they are taking on by deviating from portfolio theory. 
In summary, there is mounting evidence that people who have more of a propensity to 
gamble deviate from portfolio theory more than those who have less of a propensity to gamble. 
There is also evidence that stock market investing is a substitute for gambling activity and that 
people are aware that they are taking on additional risk when they deviate from portfolio theory. 
The finding of a link between propensity to gamble and propensity to deviate from portfolio 
theory suggests that people deviate from portfolio theory for the same reasons that they gamble. 
Accordingly, if people gamble to satisfy certain needs, we may be able to infer that people also 
deviate from portfolio theory to satisfy those same needs.  
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3.2. Gambling (and Deviating from Portfolio Theory) to Satisfy Needs 
The analysis in this Part draws on research from the fields of economics and psychology 
into why people gamble. I first review the prevailing views in economics and psychology that 
people gamble because they suffer from cognitive distortions. I then review (i) more recent 
theories in economics that people obtain utility from gambling and (ii) theories in psychology 
that people engage in leisure gambling to fulfil certain needs. I follow with a summary of the 
tenets of evolutionary psychology, which I believe offers some promising reasons for why and 
under what circumstances people engage in risky behavior, such as deviating from portfolio 
theory.34 
Research in the field of psychology into why people gamble has only been rigorously 
conducted during the last 30 years and has generally been limited to studying the motivations of 
problem gamblers (Fortune & Goodie 2012).35 Much of this research has focussed on whether 
problem gambling is associated with various cognitive distortions (Fortune & Goodie 2012). 
Even less is known about what motivates leisure gamblers – that research is in a nascent stage.36 
However, the results of the limited research into leisure gambling suggests that leisure gamblers 
may not suffer from the same cognitive disorders as do problem gamblers (Fortune & Goodie 
2012). As well, leisure may have different personality traits than problem gamblers (Goodie 
2005).37 As the motivations and personalities of leisure gamblers may differ substantially from 
those of problem gamblers, it is not clear how relevant the research into problem gambling is to 
leisure gambling (Fortune & Goodie 2012; Binde 2013). 
The prevailing view in economics is that people gamble because of cognitive distortions 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1953). However, as discussed 
                                                           
34 The use of biological behavioral science, such as evolutionary psychology, in the study of law is recent but 
growing. For an overview of the field of Law and Behavioral Biology, see (Jones & Goldsmith 2005). For a 
discussion on how principles of evolution may be incorporated into the field of economics, see (Gandolfi et al. 
2002). 
35 The psychology literature uses the terms “pathological gambler” and “problem gambler”. A problem gambler is 
someone who is or is at risk of becoming a pathological gambler (Jacobsen et al. 2007). 
36 See Binde (2013) for a discussion on what motivates leisure gamblers. I use the terms non-problem gambler and 
leisure gambler interchangeably. There appears to have been a belief among some academics that the study of 
leisure gambling was a “taboo” subject in the academic world – see (Thompson & Potts 2011). The finding of that 
paper, based on empirical evidence, is that gamblers are happier than non-gamblers. The likely relationship is that 
happy people tend to gamble more than unhappy people, rather than gambling causing happiness. 
37 For example, leisure gamblers are less confident and more risk averse than problem gamblers. 
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below, recent scholarship attempts to fit the desire to gamble into the theory of expected utility 
maximization. 
 
3.2.1. Cognitive Distortions 
Greatly influenced by Amos Tversky and Danial Kahneman, the prevailing wisdom in 
both psychology and economics is that cognitive distortions play a leading role in gambling 
(Fortune & Goodie 2012). Kahneman and Tversky are also the founders of the field of 
behavioral economics, which is the branch of economics most closely associated with the study 
of decision making under conditions of uncertainty. Unsurprisingly then, in both psychology and 
contemporary economics, much of the research into gambling has to do with identifying the 
cognitive disorders which lead people to gamble and (particularly in psychology) considering 
ways in which such cognitive disorders may be corrected.  
Kahneman and Tversky suggest that in making decisions under uncertainty, people do 
not seem to calculate the odds or to rely on statistical analysis. Rather, they appear to rely on 
heuristics, and it is the reliance on these heuristics which sometimes leads people to make 
systematic errors or biased judgements (Kahneman & Tversky 1973). The cognitive distortions 
that gamblers (or, at least, gamblers who are pathological gamblers) suffer from are thought to be 
caused by the biases from using the heuristics identified by Kahneman and Tversky (Fortune & 
Goodie 2012).  
Fortune & Goodie (2012) catalogue the common gambling-related cognitive distortions 
and associate them with the heuristics identified by Kahneman and Tversky. For example, they 
observe that pathological gamblers believe that they can influence the outcome of random events 
and they suggest that this cognitive distortion is based on the availability heuristic.38 Pathological 
gamblers also believe that there are correlations between independent events such as the outcome 
of a toss of a coin – if heads comes up, say, 4 times in a row, they believe that the odds of tails 
coming up in the next toss is more than 50% (Jacobsen et al. 2007; Fortune & Goodie 2012). 
This latter distortion, often referred to as “gamblers fallacy” is very prominent in pathological 
gamblers and is thought to be a distortion derived from the representative heuristic (Jacobsen et 
                                                           
38 Known in the psychology literature as the illusion of control (Fortune & Goodie 2012).  
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al. 2007; Fortune & Goodie 2012). Pathological gamblers also tend to be overconfident due to 
using the representative heuristics (Fortune & Goodie 2012). The availability heuristic is thought 
to be the reason for the observed phenomenon of big wins early in a person’s gambling 
experience making it more likely that the person will become a pathological gambler – the early 
wins contribute to an expectation of winning in the mind of the person (Jacobsen et al. 2007).39 
Pathological gamblers also believe that their chances of success are “higher than the objective 
probability should warrant” (Fortune & Goodie 2012, p.301). Note the similarity between the 
cognitive distortions that appear to motivate pathological gamblers and the cognitive distortions 
which have been identified in the field of behavioral finance which cause investors to deviate 
from portfolio theory (see introduction to Part III). 
More than 80% of people in many western countries have gambled at some point in their 
lives (Young & Stevens 2009). However, only a small percentage of the population have ever 
become pathological or problem gamblers (Shaffer et al. 1999).40 Some of the cognitive 
distortions identified in the previous paragraph have been shown not to apply, or to apply to a 
much lesser extent to leisure gamblers. For example, leisure gamblers appear to be less 
overconfident and less prone to the illusion of control than are problem gamblers (Goodie 2005). 
Leisure gamblers are also less subject to gambler’s fallacy and to seeing illusory patterns (Wilke 
et al. 2014). As well, pathological gamblers have been found to be more certain than leisure 
gamblers of their erroneous perceptions (Jacobsen et al. 2007; Cote et al. 2003). Lambos and 
Delfabbro (2007) find that pathological gamblers make more cognitive mistakes than leisure 
gamblers. Leisure gamblers have also been found to be less impulsive than pathological 
gamblers (Breen & Zuckerman 1999). Accordingly, it does not follow from the research into 
problem gambling that cognitive distortions are a primary motivation for the vast bulk of 
gamblers. Rather, leisure gamblers may gamble to fulfil certain needs. 
 
 
                                                           
39 Compare that finding to (Kaustia & Knupfer 2008), in which the researchers find that people who do well in the 
first IPO that they buy into are much more likely to buy into another IPO than those who do not do well on the first 
one. 
40 They find that the lifetime adult prevalence for pathological gambling is around 1.5% and the lifetime adult 
prevalence for problem gambling is around 3.85%.  
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3.2.2. Gambling as Needs Fulfilment 
 
3.2.2.1. Views of Economists 
 Economists have struggled to explain the prevalence of gambling. The accepted view is 
that, in a world with decreasing marginal utility of income, rational actors would never accept a 
fair bet because the gain in utility of a win would be less than the loss of utility in the case of a 
loss (Marshall 1890). In their treatise of 1953, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern 
formalized the concept of decreasing marginal utility of income into several axioms.41 Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern were certainly aware that gambling was problematic for their model. 
They ask in their treatise: “May there not exist in an individual a (positive or negative) utility of 
the mere act of “taking a chance,” of gambling, which the use of the mathematical expectation 
obliterates?” (Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1953, p.28). They quickly answered this question 
in the negative on the grounds that such a utility would contradict the axioms they formulate in 
their treatise.42 More recently, Paul Samuelson stated that gambling involves only transfers of 
money, “creating no new money or goods” (Samuelson 1947).  
Marschak (1950) gave the following example of a situation in which one might 
reasonably be said to gain utility from a risky activity: A mountain climber might prefer to climb 
a mountain that has a 95% survival rate than climbing either (i) a mountain that has an 80% 
survival rate or (ii) a mountain that has a 100% survival rate. However, this preference set is not 
recognized by an expected utility model since it violates the axiom of monotonicity (Marschak 
1950). Marschak suggests that revising the concept of rational choice to reflect “the love of 
danger” would make it impossible to attain “manageable utility indices” (Marschak 1950, 
p.139). John Harsanyi and others have suggested that utility theory excludes gambling utility 
because any utility associated with gambling has to do with the process of gambling and not with 
the consequences of gambling (discussed in Le Menestrel 2001). In summary, while some of the 
leading early thinkers on utility theory acknowledged that it is possible that individuals may 
                                                           
41 The axioms include transitivity, completeness, stochastic dominance and monotonicity (Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern 1953) 
42 “Thus a suitable definition of utility (which in such a situation is essentially uniquely determined by our axioms) 
eliminates in this case the specific utility or disutility of gambling, which prima facie appeared to exist” (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern 1953, p.629). 
 32 
 
obtain utility from gambling, they could not fit gambling utility into a rational expectations 
model and, accordingly, they chose to ignore any concept of gambling utility in their models.  
An early attempt to explain gambling within expected utility theory was provided by 
Milton Friedman and L.J. Savage (Friedman & Savage 1948). They developed a utility function 
to explain why individuals might be risk seeking regarding certain decisions and risk averse 
regarding other decisions. The neo-classical utility function that describes the marginal utility of 
money is concave throughout. In contrast, the utility function Friedman and Savage develop is 
concave in some parts and convex in others.43 The implication of such a function is that for some 
decisions, the expected utility associated with the good outcome of a gamble outweighs the 
expected loss in utility associated with the bad outcome of that gamble, even though the expected 
money gain is less than the expected money loss. For example, a person in a low socio-economic 
class may buy a lottery ticket because the benefit of a win is very large (he moves to a higher 
socio-economic class) and the cost of losing is very low (the cost of a lottery ticket may have 
almost no impact on his standard of living). Accordingly, the individual may buy a lottery ticket 
even if the expected return on the ticket is decidedly negative. This utility function also explains 
why an individual who gambles also buys insurance. Paying an insurance premium may have 
little effect on an individual’s standard of living, but an uninsured loss may cause the individual 
to lose socio-economic status (Friedman & Savage 1948).  
More recently, researchers have developed models to explain gambling that maintain the 
traditional concavity of utility functions. John Conlisk developed a model in which there is a 
separate utility to the process of gambling that is not captured by the income utility function and 
once this separate utility is taken into account, gambling fits within the diminishing marginal 
returns to income model (Conlisk 1993). This separate utility has to do with the suspense and 
excitement of the process of gambling. Marc Le Menestrel maintains the axioms of the neo-
classical expected utility function but suggests that individuals may also be motivated by the 
process of gambling and, accordingly, that “a rational individual” . . . [will take into account] . . 
. “a preferred process and a preferred consequence” (Le Menestrel 2001, p.251). John Nyman 
et al. suggest that gambling fits within the traditional concave utility function once you take into 
account the fact that individuals who gain gambling winnings get an additional benefit that they 
                                                           
43 For a diagram of the function, see Friedman & Savage (1948), at p. 295. It bears a resemblance to the kinked 
value function developed by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). 
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do not get from labor income, namely that they do not have to work for the gambling winnings – 
gambling income thus commands a premium over labour income (Nyman et al. 2008; Nyman et 
al. 2013).  
While none of these theories have gained wide acceptance among economists, they show 
an increased understanding that neo-classical expected utility theory ought to be able to account 
for the observed facts that people derive some form of utility from gambling (Diecidue 2004). 
While economists have generally understood that people may derive utility from gambling, that 
utility is not the type of utility that can be modelled and, accordingly, it has been ignored.  
 
3.2.2.2. Views of Psychologists 
Because research into the psychology of gambling started relatively recently, it is almost 
exclusively studied through the lens of cognitive distortions and personality variables, which are 
the psychological disciplines that prevailed throughout the entire period that the subject has been 
studied (Jacobsen et al. 2007). However, recent scholarship has started to consider biological, 
social and evolutionary reasons for why people gamble. Some of this research suggests that 
people engage in leisure gambling not only due to cognitive distortions but also to satisfy certain 
human needs, such as the need to garner social rewards or to experience the pleasurable 
anticipation of a potential reward (Binde 2009).  
Per Binde recently developed a theory that while “a chance of winning” is common to all 
forms of gambling, it is not the real motive for leisure gambling – “. . . pure money is the 
medium of gambling, not what gambling actually is about” (Binde 2009, p.83). The possibility 
of gain through gambling induces feelings of pleasure and satisfaction. Studies show that 
winning can trigger certain neurochemical processes in the brains of humans and animals – the 
positive feelings associated with being rewarded for taking risk may thus be the result of natural 
selection. As well, since human societies are built on the concept of reciprocity, receiving more 
than one pays in a gambling game is “exceptional and pleasant” (Binde 2009, p.87). In Binde’s 
theory, the psychological and symbolic value of winning are the ingredients that help fulfil other 
motivations for leisure gambling (Binde 2009).  
It is fair to say that this theory is in its early stages. However, it raises an interesting 
counterpoint to the prevailing view that gamblers gamble because of cognitive distortions. 
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3.2.2.3. Evolutionary Psychology 
Evolutionary psychology is the scientific field that stands at the intersection of 
evolutionary biology and cognitive science (Cosmides & Tooby 1994). It is a field that may help 
to explain the circumstances under which people prefer to gamble (and to deviate from portfolio 
theory) rather than to take the safer decision. In this Part, I very briefly describe the field of 
evolutionary psychology and summarize what it might say about decision making under 
uncertainty. 
Evolutionary biology posits that a trait of an organism will be selected for if that trait 
increases the fitness of the organism (Sterelney & Griffiths 1999). Fitness in this context means 
the rate at which genes are passed on to the next generation (Cosmides & Tooby 1994). The 
human brain will have evolved at least from the time that humanoids first appeared, with the 
traits that were most conducive to fitness being passed on from generation to generation. 
However, evolution is a slow process. During almost all this time that our brains were evolving, 
humans were hunter-gatherers living in small social groups, and so the architecture of the brain 
that humans now possess would have evolved to help people adapt to the environment in which 
hunter-gatherers found themselves, rather to our current environment. As the environment in 
which we now live is much different from the one in which our brains developed, our brains may 
not be as well suited to our current environment as they could be. In other words, our brains 
remain “functionally specialized to solve problems that were characteristic of hunter-gatherer 
societies, rather than those of the modern world (e.g. habitat selection; foraging; social 
exchange; competition from small armed groups; parental care; language acquisition; 
contagion avoidance; sexual rivalry)” (Cosmides & Tooby 1994, p.329).  
Rational expectations models of economics are based on the assumption that our brains 
are general purpose instruments in the sense that they solve any type of problem using the same 
computational rules and the same logic (Kenrick et al. 2009; Haselton et al. 2009). Evolutionary 
psychology, on the other hand, posits that we use different systems for managing different 
challenges that we need to meet to survive and procreate (Kenrick et al. 2009).  These include 
obtaining status, obtaining a mate, retaining a mate, obtaining friends, self-protection, caring for 
kin and self-protection. Evolutionary psychology also differentiates between proximate and 
 35 
 
ultimate reasons for doing a thing (Tybur 2013). For example, the proximate reason for a man 
buying a Prius automobile may be to help the environment but the ultimate reason for doing so 
may be to increase his status, thereby becoming more attractive to women (Kenrick & 
Griskevicius 2013; Sexton & Sexton 2011).  
Hunter-gatherers would have had to evolve mechanisms for assessing risk in many 
different circumstances (e.g. whether to risk injury by hunting or by challenging someone in the 
group for status) (Gigerenzer 2008; Cosmides & Tooby 1996). Those who were good at 
assessing those risks would have survived (and passed along their genes) to a greater degree than 
those who were not as good as assessing those risks. There is ethnographic evidence that “in a 
variety of socio-economic systems and for a variety of behaviors, we are able to act as if capable 
of assessing outcome distributions, value functions and needs or aspiration levels, and of 
implementing effective, risk-sensitive actions” (Winterhalder 2007, p.442). In many situations, 
we do not actually calculate the odds, but assess risk, variance and return using heuristics 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1973; Gigerenzer 2008). It may be that we apply those same risk 
assessment mechanisms to assessing financial risk. 
The evolutionary biology concept of life history theory, which evolutionary psychology 
has adopted,  posits that organisms must make decisions about how much time and resources to 
allocate to present reproduction as opposed to allocating resources to things like growth and 
survival, which will assist it in future reproduction (Kaplan & Gangestad 2005). The organism 
makes these decisions at any particular time based on such things as its sex, age and its 
subjective life expectancy (Kaplan & Gangestad 2005). Life history theory has been applied to 
human decision making (Wang et al. 2009). Evolutionary psychology stipulates that, in addition 
to risky decision-making being domain specific, it is also not stable over a person’s lifetime. 
Whether a person takes a risky or a safe decision in any particular circumstance may also depend 
on where that individual is in his or her life cycle and on the particular environmental cues which 
that individual has been subjected to in the past or in the present (Wang et al. 2009). For 
example, single men (who are likely to be in mate acquisition mode) may make riskier decisions 
in order to acquire resources (which they will need to attract a mate) than married men, who 
might be more concerned with not losing resources because they are in mate retention mode 
(Frankenhuis & Karremans 2012).  
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Evolutionary psychology has been criticized as being a “just so” theory (Sterelney & 
Griffiths 1999). One problem is that since we evolved in an environment that is much different 
than the one which we now inhabit, the link between our evolutionary history and the current 
utility of that evolution is quite weak (Sterelney & Griffiths 1999). As well, environment can 
change the organism, so that putting an organism in an environment that is different from the one 
in which it evolved weakens the link between evolution and fitness.44 As well, homo sapiens are 
the only surviving humanoids, so it is impossible to compare our traits to those of closely related 
species as biologists do with, for example, birds (Sterelney & Griffiths 1999).  
While it is difficult to directly test evolutionary psychology theories by looking back 
through our evolutionary history, it is possible to test the theories experimentally. The general 
design of evolutionary psychology experiments is to prime the subjects in a treatment group to 
be in a certain mode (e.g. mating, disease avoidance) before conducting a task, then comparing 
the results of that task with the results from a control group who have performed the same task 
but who have not been primed. Priming involves subjecting subjects to a stimulus (e.g. viewing 
photographs or reading stories) with the purpose of determining whether exposure to that 
stimulus subconsciously influences subjects’ behavior in a subsequent task (Shanks et al. 2013). 
A number of experiments (many of which I refer to later in the Part) have been conducted to test 
whether subjects’ propensity to make risky decisions change if they are in a certain evolutionary 
mode. Under these experiments, subjects are generally primed to be in a specific evolutionarily 
important mode, such as mate acquisition mode or status seeking mode. They are then asked to 
engage in a task to determine whether they make risker decisions than subjects in the control 
group. As deviating from portfolio theory is riskier than abiding by portfolio theory, these 
experiments may also help to explain the ultimate reasons why people deviate from portfolio 
theory.  
The balance of this Part applies evolutionary psychology theory and empirical evidence 
(including the experiments referred to above) to determine why people may under-diversify their 
stock portfolios and buy lottery-type stocks.  
 
                                                           
44 For example, improved diets mean that people are taller now than 100 years ago, so it is not possible to say that 
human height optimizes fitness (Sterelney & Griffiths 1999, p.315) 
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3.2.2.3.1. Risk Sensitive Foraging Theory 
Evolutionary biologists studying animal foraging behavior find that if there are two 
potential foraging areas open to an animal, it will choose the one that has less variability in yield 
even if the other has a greater expected yield, provided that the one with less variability in yield 
provides enough to sustain the animal (Ermer et al. 2008). This is known as risk sensitive 
foraging theory (Rode et al. 1999). From a survival point of view, this makes sense. More 
variability in yield might lead to some good feasts but it also leaves open the possibility of not 
eating for a few days and thus perishing. It is only when the less variable foraging area cannot 
sustain the animal that it will forage in the more variable area. The human brain evolved during a 
time that we were foragers, so it is reasonable to conjecture that we are also “functionally 
specialized for making [foraging] decisions” (Rode et al. 1999, p.300; also, Haselton et al. 
2009). In other words, humans may have an evolved system for making risk-sensitive 
judgements that combines data about means, variance and need to come up with the optimal 
decision, without actually making the detailed calculations. Observations of groups who are still 
hunter-gatherers show that they typically make decisions that minimize the risk of not getting 
sufficient food, rather than maximizing the abundance of food (Kenrick & Griskevicius 2013; 
Kenrick et al. 2009).  
If the human brain is specialized for making risk-sensitive resource acquisition 
judgements, then that same function could be used to make resource acquisition decisions for 
things other than food (Ermer et al. 2008). Indeed, risk sensitive foraging theory could be applied 
to stock market investing. Investors have the choice of adopting a low variance diversified 
approach or a higher risk undiversified approach. If taking a low variance portfolio approach to 
investing will not yield the investor enough to meet his or her goals, the investor will have to 
adopt a high variance undiversified portfolio approach to investing to have any chance of 
meeting those goals. This theory is consistent with the empirical evidence in finance that those 
who have less wealth tend to under-diversify their stock portfolios more than their relatively 
wealthy counterparts. Less wealthy investors may buy lottery-type stocks because getting a large 
payoff may be the only way for them to achieve their aspirations. 
Risk-sensitive foraging theory may also be applied to the acquisition of status (Ermer et 
al. 2008). As discussed in Part III.2.c.ii., status is important to men because women prefer to 
mate with men who have it. If a man has insufficient status to attract a mate, he may have to 
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adopt a risky status-seeking strategy, as adopting the safe strategy means that he will fail in an 
evolutionary sense. Applying risk sensitive foraging theory to stock market investing, low status 
men would prefer a highly variable investment strategy while high status men would opt for a 
less variable strategy to make it less likely that they lose status (Daly & Wilson 2001). 
Accordingly, consistent with the empirical finance data, risk sensitive foraging theory predicts 
that low status men (proxied by those with relatively less wealth) would under-diversify and hold 
lottery-type stocks and that high status men would tend to hold a diversified portfolio.  
 
3.2.2.3.2. Risk-taking to Acquire Status 
It has been hypothesized that, like many mammals, humans evolved in small social 
groups in which status relative to others in the group was important, particularly for males 
(Ermer et al. 2008). Status determines mating opportunities and access to resources. Dominance 
theory is a well-developed evolutionary tool which is used to predict the circumstances under 
which animals will compete for status. As status is always a relative concept, competing for 
status is risky because an increase in one person’s status necessarily means a relative reduction in 
another person’s status. As a result, competing for status with other males may lead to injury (in 
humans, this might include social injury) if competitors decide to fight back (Ermer et al. 2008). 
Accordingly, deciding when and when not to compete for status is evolutionary very important 
for men and they should have developed mechanisms for assessing the risks and rewards of 
competing for status in any given circumstance. Competing for status includes competing for 
“culturally valued resources” (Ermer et al. 2008, p.107), such as money in our society. Cross-
cultural studies show that women prefer men who have high status, but that men tend not to be 
concerned with women’s status in determining a mate (Gray 2004). 
One evolutionary reason for humans (and particularly for men) having evolved risk 
assessment capabilities is to be able to weigh the risks and rewards of acquiring resources to 
increase status and consequent mating opportunities. A well-developed mechanism for weighing 
these risks and rewards should lead to increased mating opportunities and increased fitness. In 
addition, taking risks to acquire resources may be a way to directly acquire a mate. Experiments 
have shown that when men are primed to be in mate acquisition mode they are more likely to 
take risks to acquire resources than men in control groups that have not been so primed (Baker & 
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Maner 2008).45 There is also evidence that when the ratio between men and women is high, men 
make riskier financial decisions because men must compete more strongly for mating 
opportunities (Griskevicius et al. 2012). When the ratio of men to women is high, a man who 
takes a slow and steady approach to financial decision making may find that there are few 
potential mates available by the time he acquires sufficient resources to attract a mate. As well, 
men gamble more than women across cultures (Gray 2004).  
The empirical evidence from finance is that single men under-diversify and hold lottery-
type stocks to a much greater extent than women or married men. Single men may be adopting 
this investment strategy because they want a chance of a quick big win. A big win will increase 
their status and, accordingly, increase their chances of acquiring a mate. If the investment 
strategy does not pay off (i.e. the big win does not come through), they may be no worse off in 
terms of their chances of acquiring a mate than if they had followed a portfolio theory strategy 
(Griskevicius et al. 2012). 
 
3.2.2.3.3. Risk-taking as Signalling 
Risk-taking behavior itself might be a way for men to signal to women their value as a 
mate (Hugill et al. 2011). Risk-taking may signal attributes that are desired by women, such as 
confidence, ambition and mental acuity. Accordingly, male risk-taking may increase the number 
of mating opportunities (Baker & Maner 2009). Risk-taking may also be a way for men to signal 
their gene quality – the theory being that only men with good genes can bear the cost of engaging 
in unnecessarily risky behavior (Sundie et al. 2011). The theory is analogous to the theory of 
why peahens prefer peacocks with large showy tails. The tails are a signal of good genes as only 
peacocks with good genes could afford to carry around such unwieldy appendages and survive 
predators (Sundie et al. 2011).  
Men who were primed with sexual/romantic arousal took more risks in a recent 
experimental task, but only when they were told that “a romantically available female would 
view their performance” (Baker & Maner 2009, p.1138). In an experiment to test whether 
women were more attracted to risk takers, men completed a questionnaire regarding their risk-
                                                           
45 Men are also inclined to accept a smaller amount today rather than to wait for a larger amount in the future in the 
presence of attractive women (Wilson & Daly 2004). 
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taking propensity, following which they performed a dance. Female participants were then 
shown a video (blurred to mask facial and physical attributes) of those men dancing and were 
asked to rate their attractiveness. Female participants reported being more attracted to dancers 
who had self-reported a high propensity to take risk (Hugill et al. 2011). In another study, 
women who were interested in short term relationships reported that they preferred men who 
were financial risk-takers (Sylwester & Pawłowski 2011). So, there is some evidence that 
financial risk-taking is in itself an attribute to which women respond positively. Accordingly, it 
may be that men under-diversify their stock market investments to signal to women their 
desirable qualities. 
Risk-taking may also be a signal to other men. Daniel Fessler recently tested his 
hypothesis, which he calls the Crazy Bastard theory, that men engage in risky activity because 
men who become known as risk-takers are less likely to be challenged by other men. Fessler 
showed that men who engage in risky activity in an experiment were perceived by other men as 
having greater physically stature, even though they had the same physical stature as the non-risk-
takers (Fessler et al. 2014). This is consistent with the results of an experiment conducted by 
Ermer et al. (2008) that men (but not women) make riskier financial decisions in the presence of 
men who they expect to compete with for status.  
 
3.2.2.3.4. Life History Theory 
As discussed in Part III.2.c., under life history theory, organisms allocate resources 
between current reproduction efforts and somatic effort, such as strengthening the body and 
survival. More somatic effort now may mean more future reproduction, but only if the organism 
survives. One variable that is relevant to the organism’s allocation between current reproduction 
effort and somatic effort is the subjective life expectancy of the organism. Organisms which 
expect a long life tend to defer reproduction efforts and focus on somatic effort early in life, 
while those with a short life expectancy will start reproducing early in life (Griskevicius et al. 
2011; Ellis et al. 2012). This has also been shown to be true within species (i.e. those individuals 
who have a short life expectancy will start reproducing sooner than those with a longer life 
expectancy) (Griskevicius et al. 2011). This ability to use environmental cues to trade off the 
risks of current versus deferred reproduction is evolutionary designed – those organisms who are 
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better at making these decisions will have better fitness than those organisms that are not good at 
making those assessments (Wang et al. 2009).  
Life history theory has been applied to human behavior. Studies have shown that people 
who have a lower life expectancy at birth, who grew up with low socioeconomic status, or who 
grew up in violent or unstable environments are more likely to have children earlier in life 
(Griskevicius et al. 2011). Vladis Griskevicius conducted a series of experiments to test the 
hypothesis that the same relationship would hold with respect to financial decision making; that 
is, that those who grew up with low socioeconomic status would be more likely to make risky 
financial decisions. He hypothesized that people who grew up being uncertain about the future 
will use their environmental cues to take risks to increase their current wealth since future wealth 
will be of less subjective value to them. The results of the experiments were consistent with 
Griskevicius’s hypothesis (Griskevicius et al. 2011).  
The empirical evidence in finance is that relatively poor investors under-diversify more 
than richer investors (Kumar 2009). To the extent that there is a correlation between wealth 
during childhood and wealth in adulthood, the fact that less wealthy investors under-diversify is 
consistent with the life history theory. Relatively poor investors would be more likely to prefer a 
quick big win than richer investors and would be less interested in following a slow and steady 
diversified investment strategy because they subjectively believe that they may not live long 
enough to enjoy the fruits of the slow and steady strategy.46 
Life history theory may explain why single men disproportionately under-diversify their 
investment portfolios and hold lottery-type stocks. Single men are more likely to be in the mate 
acquisition stage of their life history. Accordingly, they may be disposed to take risks to acquire 
resources and status, which may increase their chances of acquiring a mate (Daly & Wilson 
2001). Married men, who are more likely to be in mate retention mode, may be more concerned 
with not losing resources and, accordingly, they may be more likely to take a slow and steady 
diversified portfolio approach than single men (Daly & Wilson 2001). The finance evidence in 
                                                           
46 In a recent experiment, participants who came from a lower childhood socio-economic background and who were 
primed for mortality threats chose more diversified portfolios.  However, that experiment was not directly testing 
risk-reward trade-offs since participants in that experiment were not given any information about the risk or return 
on the portfolios from which they could choose (White et al. 2013). 
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consistent with the life history theory, as it shows that single men under-diversify and hold 
lottery-type stocks to a much greater degree than women or married men.  
 
3.2.3. Summary of Evolutionary Reasons for Under-diversifying 
 The finance studies summarized earlier in this chapter illustrate that individual investors 
who have certain demographic attributes, such as low socioeconomic status, being single, being 
male and being young, are more likely to under-diversify their stock portfolios. Evolutionary 
theories of human risk-taking predict that people with those same demographic attributes will 
take risky decisions to meet certain evolutionary challenges, such as mate acquisition.  
Accordingly, it may be that people under-diversify and buy lottery-type stocks to (consciously or 
unconsciously) meet these evolutionary challenges. Whether that investing behavior is actually 
beneficial to investors is an open question; that is, does deviating from portfolio theory really 
help investors meet those evolutionary challenges, or is the perceived benefit illusory? 
It ought to be possible to experimentally test whether there are evolutionary explanations 
for individual investors’ under-diversifying. The framework of the experiment would be to prime 
participants to be in, say, mate acquisition mode before having them participate in an investment 
game. Their investment behavior would then be compared to the behavior of a control group that 
participated in the same investment game. Another approach is to test whether low status males 
make different investment decisions than high status males in a simulated investment game. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Individual investors deviate from portfolio theory by trading too much and under-
diversifying their stock portfolios. The empirical evidence in finance is that these deviations are 
very costly to investors. Individual investors incur unnecessary commissions and other 
transaction costs associated with trading and they are not adequately rewarded for the risk they 
take on by holding undiversified portfolios. In addition, their preference for lottery-type stocks 
result in the expected returns on those stocks being lower than the CAPM predicts. 
 A rational individual investor who was only interested in maximizing his or her expected 
investment returns would adopt a buy and hold strategy and would avoid lottery-type stocks. The 
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observed fact that individual investors do not follow this investment strategy might mean that 
they deviate from portfolio theory to satisfy current needs. 
The needs that individual investors may be attempting to satisfy by deviating from 
portfolio theory may be evolutionarily driven. Numerous studies in finance show that investors 
who are young, single, male or who have relatively low wealth tend to deviate from portfolio 
theory more than investors in other demographics. These results are consistent with the 
evolutionary psychology literature on risk-taking. That literature finds that young, single men of 
low status make riskier decisions than others, particularly when they are primed for status 
seeking or mate acquisition. It ought to be possible to test the evolutionary psychology theories 
for portfolio theory deviation through experiments in which investors are primed for status 
seeking or mate acquisition and then observing their investment behavior as compared to a 
control group that was not so primed. In chapter 2, I report on the results of an experiment I 
conducted to test whether males who have been primed to be in mate-seeking mode under-
diversify more than those who have not been so primed. 
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Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks 
 
1. Summary and Findings 
The evidence from finance and behavioral economics is that people are generally not 
very good at managing their retirement savings.1 People tend to save too little, pay high 
investment management fees, under-diversify their portfolios and draw down their savings too 
soon (Benartzi & Thaler 2007).  
While behavioral economists have identified the biases and heuristics behind many of the 
bad financial decisions that people tend to make, they have yet to even propose an overarching 
theory for why people make these mistakes. The contribution of this dissertation is to suggest a 
framework within which to explain why people make bad financial decisions. The framework 
that I develop in this book is based on natural selection and evolutionary psychology.  
Evolutionary psychologists assume that we use different modules of the brain to solve 
different problems. As saving for retirement using financial instruments is a very recent problem, 
and not one that our distant ancestors had to solve to survive and reproduce, the human brain has 
not evolved to effortlessly solve problems of saving for consumption far into the future. 
Accordingly, we use modules that evolved to solve other problems to solve problems relating to 
retirement savings. As a result, the retirement savings decision that a person makes may depend 
on which evolutionarily important issue is salient at the time of making the decision. For 
example, if mate-seeking is salient, the person might make riskier decisions and if self-protection 
is salient (e.g. because a terror attack is in the news), the person might make a less risky decision. 
As discussed in detail in chapter 2, evolutionary psychology assumes that humans use 
different systems to solve different evolutionarily important problems. Economists, on the other 
hand, assume that the human brain is a general-purpose instrument – that it uses the same 
systems to solve all problems. This is perhaps one reason why economists have been very slow 
                                                           
1 As discussed in section 2 below, this may explain why governments are involved in regulating 
retirement savings at all. 
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to adopt evolutionary psychology to explain peoples’ tendency to make poor retirement savings 
decisions (Kenrick & Griskevicius 2013). 
In chapter 2, I develop a comprehensive theory as to how evolutionary psychology can 
explain the observations that individuals make systematic mistakes in their retirement savings 
planning, focussing on the mistake of portfolio under-diversification. I base this theory on 
existing empirical evidence from finance, evolutionary psychology, psychology and 
neuroscience. I show how evolutionary psychology and neuroscience experiments, and recent 
psychology literature on gambling may all help to explain the data from finance and behavioral 
economics which shows that people make systematic mistakes in their investment behavior. The 
intent of that chapter is only to suggest how evolutionary psychology could explain the 
retirement savings mistakes that have been observed. The chapter does not prove that those 
mistakes are caused by brains that are ill-evolved to deal with modern finance. It merely sets the 
groundwork for designing and conducting experiments that may eventually support or disprove 
the theory. 
In chapter 3, I report the results of an experiment which I conducted to test one of the 
hypotheses that I developed in chapter 2. The hypothesis is that males for whom mate-seeking is 
salient will under-diversify their stock portfolios more than other males. The results of the 
experiment show that males for whom mate-seeking is made salient did under-diversify their 
stock portfolios more than men in the control treatment for whom mate-seeking was not made 
salient. While this result lends support for using an evolutionary psychology approach, caution 
must be taken when applying the results. I was not able to fully rule out other reasons for the 
difference in behavior for those in the treatment group from those in the control group, such as a 
differential impact of the treatment on mood. Furthermore, the result was from just one 
experiment, and that experiment was not incentivized. The results could well be different in an 
incentivized experiment or when males are investing for retirement in the real world. A follow-
up experiment to further test the theory would be to run the same experiment using only female 
subjects and showing those in the treatment group photographs of attractive males. Evolutionary 
psychology theory is that viewing those photographs would have no impact on the diversification 
decisions of females. Thus, a finding that females’ diversification decisions are unaffected by the 
treatment would further support the theory. Another follow-up experiment would be to make 
self-preservation salient (e.g. by showing photographs of war scenes) to see whether, as 
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evolutionary psychologists predict, subjects would diversify their portfolios more than those in 
the control treatment. 
Chapter 4 is a theory paper in which I develop the hypothesis that the evolutionarily 
important emotion of regret may explain many of the mistakes we observe people making in 
their retirement savings planning. The importance of regret is that people who feel it tend to 
make better decisions than those who do not (Camille et al. 2004), which would have helped our 
ancestors survive and reproduce. I describe many of the retirement savings mistakes and 
anomalies that finance scholars have observed (mostly) using data from actual retirement savings 
plans. These include an excess reliance on defaults, making the same decisions as peers and 
paying for costly management advice. I then describe the empirical evidence from regret 
experiments conducted by psychologists and economics. Based on the those experiments, I 
suggest that a desire to minimize future regret may explain the observed retirement savings 
mistakes and anomalies. As is the case for chapter 2, I make no claim in chapter 4 to have proven 
that regret explains retirement savings mistakes. I merely set the groundwork for future 
experiments that may support or disprove the hypotheses set out in that chapter. 
Chapter 5 reports on an incentivized online experiment that I conducted with Pieter 
Desmet to test two of the hypotheses developed in chapter 4; namely that people rely on defaults 
and that they make the same investment decisions as their peers to minimize future regret.  In the 
experiment, subjects decided between 2 lotteries, Lottery A and Lottery B, and reported on their 
anticipated regret and how responsible they felt for their decision. Those in the Free Choice 
treatment simply chose between the two lotteries. In the Default treatment, Lottery B was set as a 
default and, in the Peer Choice treatment, subjects were told that in a previous experiment, 
Lottery B was preferred. The Default treatment “worked”, in the sense that a much greater 
percentage of subjects chose Lottery B than in the Free Choice treatment. However, the Peer 
Choice treatment had no significant effect on lottery choice.  
Those in the Default treatment who opted out or imagined opting out of the default 
reported that they would feel more regret in a bad outcome of that lottery than those in the Free 
Choice treatment who chose or imagined choosing Lottery A. Accordingly, the results support 
the hypothesis that the default was effective because opting out of a default induces regret and 
that people stick to the default to avoid this regret. However, as with the experiment reported in 
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chapter 3, caution should be exercised in applying the results to the real world. We conducted 
just one experiment, and the result we obtained may well be an artifact of the specific design of 
the experiment. In addition, we could not identify the pathway through which regret functions; 
that is, whether people who opted out of the default felt more regret because they felt more 
responsible for their decision or for some other reason.  
Further research is required to come to firmer conclusions. For example, one reason for 
people to accept the default is that they find it difficult to calculate the expected return or 
variance of the lotteries. Choosing the default allows them to avoid the cost of making such a 
choice. One refinement of our experiment would be use payouts and percentages that are not 
round numbers (e.g. 43.6% chance of winning $3.79). Perhaps people would be more likely to 
stick to the default in these cases to avoid the cost of making the calculations. 
In conclusion, the experiments that are reported in this dissertation support the 
hypotheses that they tested. The first experiment showed that people’s portfolio diversification 
decision may be affected by which evolutionarily important problem is salient. The second 
experiment showed that the evolutionarily important emotion of regret may play a role in 
people’s decisions to accept defaults.  
The framework that I have developed in this book for analyzing why people make 
retirement savings mistakes assumes that our brains have not had enough time to evolve to easily 
solve problems relating to retirement saving planning, including portfolio diversification. 
Accordingly, people will use modules that were evolutionarily designed to solve other problems 
to solve problems such as how much to diversify their portfolios. The results of the experiment 
reported in chapter 3 lend some support for that framework of analysis. The evidence from 
evolutionary psychology is that males take greater risk when mate-seeking is made salient 
because taking more risk provides a greater chance of a larger, more immediate gain, which may 
help in obtaining a mate. In the experiment, when mate-seeking was made salient, subjects 
under-diversified their portfolios more (i.e. they took more risk) than subjects for whom mate-
seeking was not made salient. This suggests that subjects relied on a module that was 
evolutionarily designed to solve problems related to finding aa mate to help solve portfolio 
diversification decision. 
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As discussed in chapter 4, regret evolved at a time that humans were hunter-gatherers 
living in small groups. The ability to experience regret was likely fitness enhancing because it 
induced people to take more care in their decision-making, thereby reducing the chance of 
feeling that emotion. The results of the experiment reported in chapter 5 suggests, however, that 
regret may not be well suited for making decisions that were not relevant to our distant ancestors. 
Subjects’ decision-making was influenced by whether there was a default, and the experiment 
provided evidence that the default was effective because subjects wanted to avoid Opt-out regret. 
Rather than assess the two lotteries, some subjects in the Default treatment merely stuck to the 
default lottery, perhaps to avoid deciding at all. This suggests that the evolved emotion of regret 
is not well-suited to financial decision making as their choice depends, to some extent, on which 
option happens to be set as a default. 
The achievement of this dissertation is to take the first steps in developing a coherent 
theory to explain the biases and heuristics that have been identified by behavioral economists, at 
least as they apply to retirement savings planning and stock market investing. While others have 
suggested that these biases and heuristics arise from our evolutionary past, to my knowledge, no 
one has yet attempted to apply evolutionary principles to explain these biases and heuristics in 
the retirement savings domain. I hope that I am not the last to do so, and that others will build 
upon my work. 
 
2. Implications for Retirement Savings Policy 
In a nutshell, the hypothesis of this dissertation is that people make systematic mistakes 
in their retirement savings planning because the human brain has not evolved to easily solve 
problems relating to retirement savings. In this section, I summarize below the policy 
implications for government regulation of retirement savings regulation that have previously 
been discussed in section 6 of chapter 3 and in section 6 of chapter 4. Before doing that, 
however, I provide some background to (i) what I believe is the main policy rationale for why 
governments regulate retirements savings and (ii) why governments and employers have shifted 
from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans. 
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Why are governments involved at all in providing pensions or mandating and subsidizing 
retirement savings? According to standard economic models, individuals temporally maximize 
their utility by smoothing their income over their lifetimes. That is, they will borrow early in 
their working lives, save in their middle years and draw down their savings in retirement. If, 
indeed, people act in accordance with this theory, the need for governments to be involved in 
retirement savings is not obvious – individuals will maximize their utility by acting in 
accordance with their temporal consumption preferences.2 Most countries, however, either 
provide pensions to their citizens, mandate a minimum amount of retirement savings or provide 
tax benefits to encourage individuals to save for their retirement.3 
There are two rationales in the pension policy literature for governments being involved 
in the provision of pensions. The first is the alleviation of poverty. Through misfortune, some 
people will not be able to save enough to support themselves in retirement. The rationale is that 
these people ought to be able to live out their old age in at least a modicum of comfort (European 
Commission 2015). The second, and by far the most commonly stated rationale, however, is that 
working individuals ought to be able to maintain in retirement the standard of living that they 
enjoyed while working. This second rationale has been the implicit focus of this dissertation. The 
very fact that policymakers throughout the world (including intergovernmental organizations 
such as the World Bank and the OECD4) call for government provision or subsidization of 
                                                           
2 Within the traditional economics framework, one reason for providing pensions and subsidizing 
retirement savings is the externality identified in overlapping generations models (Weiss 1991). Those 
models suggest that savings in a society will be less than the socially optimal amount because some of the 
benefits of savings and investment accrue to future generations. In the absence of compulsion or 
subsidies, individuals will not take this externality into account and will save too little. Accordingly, 
compulsory or subsidized pensions can increase social welfare by increasing the aggregate savings rate. 
However, it is not clear that, even if this externality exists, pension legislation is the appropriate 
regulatory tool to get to the socially optimal level of savings. In any event, neither government policy 
discussions nor the academic pension literature suggests that an increase in aggregate savings is a policy 
objective of pension legislation. 
 
3 See (OECD 2016) for a recent summary of pension legislation in OECD and selected other countries. 
 
4 The World Bank suggests that countries institute multi-pillar pension systems (Holzmann & Hinz 2005). 
The first pillar, a non-contributory minimum retirement income, is intended to relieve against old age 
poverty.  The additional pillars, which provide for mandatory and voluntary retirement savings, are 
intended to provide for replacement income based on income earned during working years. See also 
(OECD 2013). 
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retirement income suggests that there is a widespread belief that people will not save enough for 
their retirement without government involvement.  
As discussed in chapter 1, due to steadily increasing life expectancies and for other 
reasons, providing retirement income became much costlier for governments and employers than 
they forecasted at the time that the plans were established. Over the past few decades, many 
governments instituted changes to their pension systems to reduce these costs and to reduce the 
uncertainty of future pension funding costs. One of the changes that government made was to 
switch from providing pension benefits through DB plans to mandating (or subsidizing) savings 
through DC plans in which individuals take on the risks associated with future increases in 
longevity and risks such as investment returns being lower than forecast. In some cases, like 
Australia, governments provided for mandatory contributions to self-administered DC plans. In 
other cases, like Germany, governments provided tax subsidies to those who contribute to DC 
plans, but did not mandate contribution levels. At the same time, private-sector employers in the 
Anglo countries also switched from DB plans to DC plans. 
In almost all cases, the switch from DB plans to DC plans resulted in much of the 
decision-making relating to retirement savings plans (e.g. contribution rate decisions, asset 
allocation decisions, drawdown decisions) being transferred to individuals. Given the implicit 
rationale for retirement savings legislation that people do not, on their own, save enough for 
retirement, this seems like an odd policy proscription. It is important to note, however, the dearth 
of discussion in the literature on whether switching to DC plans would result in individuals 
would making better or worse pension decisions than governments and employers did under DB 
plans. The transfer to individuals of responsibility for managing retirement savings plan was, in a 
sense, merely a by-product of a desire on the part of governments and employers to reduce 
pension costs by, in part, shifting from DB plans to DC plans. Little thought appears to have 
been given as to whether most individuals would make good retirement savings decisions. 
The reason for reducing pension payments and transferring risk to individuals is clear. 
Pension payments as a percentage of GDP were increasing rapidly and were forecast to increase 
even more in the future. There was a feeling in many countries that pension systems were not 
sustainable in the long-run. The mistake, I believe, was putting responsibility onto individuals for 
retirement savings decision-making despite the evidence that they were not be up to the task. If, 
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as hypothesized in the dissertation, people make mistakes in managing their retirement savings 
plans, such as under-diversifying, paying excess fees and under-contributing to their DC plans, 
because the human brain has not evolved to easily solve problems relating to saving for 
retirement, then it will be very difficult to change this behavior. In fact, to the disappointment of 
economists, there is a substantial amount of evidence that financial education and disclosure has 
not lead to better retirement savings decision-making (Willis 2011; Bubb & Pildes 2014; 
Benartzi & Thaler 2007). 
As discussed, the main policy goal of government involvement in providing retirement 
income is to increase the percentage of retirees who enjoy the same standard of living in 
retirement that they did during their working years.  I suggest that, for two reasons, that policy 
goal would be better accomplished through DB plans. Firstly, DC plans are much costlier to 
administer than DB plans. Therefore, a given amount contributed to a DC plan will generate less 
retirement income than the same amount contributed to a DB plan. A major reason why DC 
plans are more expensive than DB plans is that people pay asset management fees for actively 
managed funds which generate returns that are no higher than passively managed, lower-cost 
funds. As discussed in chapter 4, regret may explain this tendency to pay for active management, 
and this may make it difficult to induce people to switch to lower cost, well-diversified index 
funds. 
Secondly, in DB plans where participants contribute a set percentage of their income to 
pooled investments (i.e. all participants in the plan have an undivided interest in the plan assets), 
all participants in the same cohort will receive a similar retirement income (as a percentage of 
their earnings). However, in DC plans, where participants contribute at different rates and invest 
in different assets, retirement incomes among those in the same cohort will vary much more than 
in DB plans. Accordingly, some DC plan participants (e.g. those who did not contribute enough 
or those who under-diversified and got unlucky) will not have enough DC plan assets to allow 
them to maintain in retirement the standard of living that they enjoy while working. If, as 
hypothesized in the dissertation, people make mistakes of under-diversifying and under-
contributing to their DC plans because the human brain has not evolved to easily solve problems 
relating to saving for retirement, then it will be very difficult to change this behavior. 
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Mandatory DC plan regimes would solve the problem of individuals not contributing 
enough to provide a sufficient retirement income. However, mandatory plans still leave open the 
possibility of under-performing the market (and therefore earning low retirement income) due to 
paying excess management fees or under-diversifying. Therefore, the policy approach that my 
research suggests is to move away from individual, self-managed retirement plans and towards a 
pooled, funded system, but one in which retirement income can be adjusted if forecasts of factors 
such as investment returns or longevity turn out to be inaccurate. In my view, the Dutch private 
pension regime is a very good model. 
The Dutch system consists of a public PAYG pension plan which pays to all retirees who 
have lived in the Netherlands for a minimum number years a pension that is a percentage of the 
country’s minimum wage. The unique part of the Dutch system, however, is the quasi-mandatory 
pension scheme offered by employers (either on a company-wide or industry-wide basis) that 
cover more than 90% of employees.  Those private pension schemes pay in the range of 70% of 
average lifetime earnings for the average worker (OECD 2015; OECD 2013). The Dutch private 
pension system is called quasi-mandatory because there is no legal requirement for employers to 
provide a pension, but most do. If an employer provides a  plan, however, the plan must comply 
with pension funding rules that are much stricter than in most other countries (Beetsma et al. 
2015).  
Under the Dutch pension legislation, the value of a pension plan’s assets must, at all 
times, exceed the present value of its liabilities. If a plan fails to be fully funded because, for 
example, average life expectancy increases or investment income falls, steps must be taken to 
become fully funded. These steps may include adjusting payments to existing retirees or 
increasing contribution rates. Part of the reason for this feature is that it would be unfair for one 
generation to be subsidizing the retirement benefits of another generation. The flexibility to 
adjust pension payments allows fund managers to fully fund the plan in a way that maintains 
fairness among generations. During the recent financial crisis, pensioners had their payments 
frozen (i.e. not indexed to inflation) to allow the private pension funds to meet their funding 
requirements. In other cases, pension payments were cut and contribution rates were raised 
(Beetsma et al. 2015).  
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In conclusion, the Dutch private pension system gives the benefits of pooling (i.e. low 
cost, professional asset management and mandatory contributions) with the flexibility to adjust 
pension payments and contribution to meet changed circumstances. For those reasons, I suggest 
that it is superior to DC plans. This is even more relevant if the reason that individuals make 
systematic mistakes in managing their retirement savings plans is that the human brain has not 
evolved to easily make retirement savings decisions. 
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Summary 
I was motivated to write this book by the evidence that individuals make costly systematic 
investment mistakes in their retirement savings planning, such as investing in the wrong assets 
and under-diversifying their portfolios. These mistakes are difficult to explain using the toolbox 
of traditional economists. Behavioral economists have stepped into the breach to explain that 
people make these mistakes because they rely on heuristics and have certain biases in their 
thinking. However, behavioral economists have yet to develope a unifying theory as to why 
people have these biases and rely on heuristics.  
In this book, I develop and test the theory that this bad investment behavior results from traits 
that evolved to help our distant ancestors survive and reproduce. I describe why it is important to 
understand the evolutionary history of our brains in order to understand why we may not be very 
good at solving retirement savings problems. 
In the first substantive chapter, chapter 2, I apply evolutionary psychology to explain one of the 
mistakes that individuals have been shown to make in their retirement planning – the mistake of 
under-diversifying their portfolios. While the chapter is focussed on explaining when and why 
individuals may under-diversify their stock portfolios, the theoretical discussion on evolutionary 
psychology theories put forward in the chapter can explain why and when individuals will make 
other seemingly sub-optimal decisions relating to their retirement planning. 
In chapter 3, I report on an online experiment that I conducted to test a hypothesis that I put 
forward in chapter 2; that is, that males for whom mate-seeking is salient under-diversify their 
stock portfolios more than other males. The results of the experiment support this hypothesis. 
Regret is an emotion that evolved to help humans learn from their mistakes, which enhanced 
their survival and rates of reproduction. I hypothesize in chapter 4 that people make retirement 
savings decisions in such a way as to minimize regret. I also explain in that chapter why regret 
may also explain why defaults work so well in the retirement savings domain – people follow 
defaults because it is a regret reducing strategy. 
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Chapter 5 reports on an experiment that was conducted to test the hypothesis that regret may 
explain why defaults and communicating preferences of peers are so effective in changing 
behavior. The results of the experiment support this hypothesis. 
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Samenvatting 
Ik was gemotiveerd om dit boek te schrijven omdat blijkt dat individuen bij hun 
pensioenplanning kostbare systematische investeringsfouten maken, zoals het investeren in de 
verkeerde activa en het onvoldoende diversifiëren van hun portefeuilles. Deze fouten zijn 
moeilijk te verklaren met behulp van de instrumenten die traditionele economen ter beschikking 
hebben. Gedragseconomen zijn in de bres gesprongen om uit te leggen dat mensen deze fouten 
maken omdat ze vertrouwen op heuristiek en bepaalde vooroordelen hebben in hun denken. 
Maar gedragseconomen moeten nog steeds een verbindende theorie ontwikkelen over waaróm 
mensen deze vooroordelen hebben en op heuristiek vertrouwen. 
In dit boek ontwikkel en test ik de theorie dat dit slechte beleggingsgedrag het gevolg is van 
eigenschappen die zijn ontwikkeld om onze verre voorouders te helpen overleven en zich voort 
te planten. Ik beschrijf waarom het belangrijk is om de evolutionaire geschiedenis van onze 
hersenen te begrijpen om te begrijpen waarom we misschien niet erg goed zijn in het oplossen 
van problemen op het gebied van pensioensparen. 
In het eerste inhoudelijke hoofdstuk, hoofdstuk 2, pas ik evolutionaire psychologie toe om een 
van de fouten te verklaren die individuen aantoonbaar maken in hun pensioenplanning - de fout 
om hun portefeuilles onvoldoende te diversifiëren. Terwijl het hoofdstuk vooral is bedoeld om 
uit te leggen wanneer en waarom mensen hun aandelenportefeuilles onvoldoende zouden kunnen 
diversifiëren, kan de theoretische discussie over theorieën uit de evolutieve psychologie die in 
het hoofdstuk wordt gepresenteerd verklaren waarom en wanneer personen andere schijnbaar 
suboptimale beslissingen nemen met betrekking tot hun pensioenplanning. 
In hoofdstuk 3 doe ik verslag over een online experiment dat ik heb uitgevoerd om een 
hypothese te testen die ik in hoofdstuk 2 heb uiteen gezet; de hypothese dat mannen met een 
opvallende drang naar het vinden van een maatje hun aandelenportefeuille meer 
onderdiversifiëren dan andere mannen. De resultaten van het experiment ondersteunen deze 
hypothese. 
Spijt is een emotie die is ontwikkeld zodat de mens leert van zijn fouten, waardoor zijn kans op 
overleven en voortplanting is toegenomen. In hoofdstuk 4 stel ik de hypothese dat mensen hun 
beslissingen over pensioensparen zodanig nemen dat ze er zo min mogelijk spijt van krijgen. Ik 
leg in dat hoofdstuk ook uit waarom spijt tevens kan verklaren waarom standaard oplossingen zo 
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goed werken op het gebied van pensioensparen - mensen volgen standaard oplossingen omdat 
het een spijt-reducerende strategie is. 
Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft een experiment dat werd uitgevoerd om de hypothese te toetsen die stelt 
dat spijt kan verklaren waarom standaardinstellingen en communicatievoorkeuren van 
gelijkgestemden zo effectief zijn in het veranderen van gedrag. De resultaten van het experiment 
ondersteunen deze hypothese. 
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